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I. INTRODUCTION
Shareholders in public companies vote not by attending the
meeting but by exercising their rights under the federal proxy rules.1
* Professor of Law, Director, Corporate & Commercial Law Program, University of
Denver Sturm College of Law.
1
See Jill E. Fisch, From Legitimacy to Logic: Reconstructing Proxy Regulation, 46 VAND.
L. REV. 1129, 1142 (1993) (“It seems to me that the heart of the problem lies in the
failure of corporate practice to reproduce through the proxy medium an annual
meeting substantially equivalent to the old meeting in person. I know that the oldfashioned meeting cannot be revived. Admittedly, that is impossible. It is not
impossible, however, to utilize the proxy machinery to approximate the conditions of
the old-fashioned meeting.”) (quoting Robert H. O’Brien, SEC Comm’r, Address
Before the Conference Board 3 (Jan. 21, 1943)); see generally Robert B. Thompson,
Delaware, the Feds, and the Stock Exchange: Challenges to the First State as First in Corporate
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Recognizing this,2 the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (“the
Commission” or “SEC”) has at times described the proxy rules as
neutral in effect, designed only to provide shareholders with the same
rights accorded under state law.3 In fact, this has often not been the
case. Over their eighty-year development, the rules have often reduced
rather than complemented the rights otherwise available to
shareholders at these meetings.
This can be seen with particular clarity in connection with the
erosion of shareholder voting rights. Under the proxy rules, Rule 14a8 permits shareholders to submit a proposal for inclusion in the proxy
statement.4 The rule contains procedural conditions and substantive
restrictions that allow for the exclusion of some proposals.
Shareholders seeking to avoid these limitations may either distribute
their own proxy statement, an often prohibitively expensive step, or,
under state law, wait for the meeting and make the proposal there.5
To the extent that shareholders opt for the latter approach, the
proxy rules all but guarantee that the effort will fail. Upon execution
of a proxy card, Rule 14a-4 allows for the involuntary transfer to
Law, 29 DEL. J. CORP. L. 779 (2004).
2
See U.S. SECS. & EXCH. COMM’N, 77TH CONG., REPORT ON PROPOSALS FOR
AMENDMENT TO THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 AND THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934,
PRINTED FOR THE USE OF THE COMMITTEE ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE 35
(Comm. Print 1941) (“Since ownership of securities . . . is today effected almost
entirely by proxies, the provisions of Section 14 are of paramount importance.”).
3
See Hearings on H.R. 1493, H.R. 1821 and H.R. 2019 Before the H. Comm. on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 78th Cong. 172 (1943) (testimony of former SEC
Chairman Purcell) [hereinafter Hearings on H.R. 1493] (“[T]he rights that we are
endeavoring to assure to the stockholders are those rights that he has traditionally had
under State law, to appear at the meeting; to make a proposal; to speak on that
proposal at appropriate length; and to have his proposal voted on.”). See also
Shareholder Proposals, Exchange Act Release No. 56160, 2007 WL 2175940, at *3 (July
27, 2007) (“Thus, the federal proxy authority is not intended to supplant state law, but
rather to reinforce state law rights with a sturdy federal disclosure and proxy
solicitation regime.”); Regulation of Communications Among Securityholders,
Exchange Act Release No. 30849, 1992 WL 151037, at *12 (June 23, 1992) (“While
voting rights and the right to vote by proxy generally are determined by state law,
federal regulation of the proxy solicitation process serves to make that right
meaningful.”).
4
17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2012).
5
See J. Robert Brown, Jr., Corporate Governance, the Securities and Exchange
Commission, and the Limits of Disclosure, 57 CATH. U. L. REV. 45, 48 (2007) (“Under state
law, shareholders had the inherent right to make proposals or nominate directors
from the floor of the meeting.”). Data on the number of proposals made at the
meeting but not appearing in the proxy statement is apparently unavailable.
Amendments to Rules on Shareholder Proposals, Exchange Act Release No. 40018,
1998 WL 254809, at *15 (May 21, 1998) (“We do not routinely record information on
the number of ‘small businesses’ that receive non-rule 14a-8 proposals each year, since
non-14a-8 proposals do not necessarily lead to a submission to the Commission.”).
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management of discretionary authority to vote against any proposal
that arises from the floor of the meeting and does not otherwise appear
in a proxy statement.6 The transfer even applies where adequate notice
of an impending proposal is provided and management has sufficient
time and opportunity to obtain voting instructions from shareholders.
Shareholders can only avoid the transfer of discretionary authority by
circulating their own proxy statement or refusing to return the proxy
card. Such a refusal forces the shareholder either to forego the right
to vote or to attend the meeting and cast a ballot in person. Neither
represents a satisfactory solution.
The policy reflected in Rule 14a-4 has been justified as beneficial
to shareholders. The approach is convenient.7 The proxy process is
rendered more efficiently.8
Imposing the restrictions avoids
shareholder “confusion.”9 In fact, the discretionary authority provided
under Rule 14a-4 is better understood as the byproduct of an uneven
evolution in the development of the proxy rules. For much of the
history of these provisions, shareholders were less organized and
showed only modest interest in their impact on corporate governance.
The rules, therefore, mostly reflected the interests of issuers. Rather
than duplicating rights available at the meeting, they were used to
restrict or reduce those rights.10
The approach to discretionary voting contained in Rule 14a-4
raises serious governance concerns. The system effectively forces
shareholders to submit proposals under Rule 14a-8 for inclusion in the
proxy statement. Only in these circumstances must management
provide shareholders with the explicit right to vote for or against the
matter and forgo the use of discretionary authority.11 At the same time,
however, reliance on Rule 14a-8 can have significant drawbacks. A

6

See infra Section III. The transfer must be disclosed.
See infra note 43.
8
See Shareholder Communications, Shareholder Participation in the Corporate
Electoral Process and Corporate Governance Generally, Exchange Act Release No.
16356, 1979 WL 173198, at *4 (Nov. 21, 1979) (“It was further argued that the proposal
would not only reduce the accuracy and efficiency of the tabulation process, but also
would overly complicate the process of voting on a proxy card, thereby fostering
shareholder disinterest and confusion.”).
9
See infra notes 45, 96.
10
See J. Robert Brown, Jr., The Evolving Role of Rule 14a-8 in the Corporate Governance
Process, 93 DENV. L. REV. ONLINE 151, 152 (2016) [hereinafter Brown, The Evolving Role
of Rule 14a-8] (with respect to Rule 14a-8, the Rule for the first five decades of existence
“existed in an environment largely defined by issuer consternation and shareholder
disinterest”).
11
Even with matters specifically listed in the proxy card, management can exercise
discretion over matters left blank. See infra Section III.A.
7
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complicated provision often interpreted in an arbitrary fashion,
shareholders must incur the expense of crafting a proposal that avoids
application of the many substantive and procedural hurdles contained
in the rule. In addition, they often must undertake the costs of defense
when management seeks omission of the proposal from the proxy
statement.12
More importantly, however, the rule is simply not available for
some types of proposals. The Commission has categorically excluded
entire topics from Rule 14a-8. Proposals are, for example, routinely
excluded to the extent addressing the rotation, ratification or
qualification of the outside auditor, despite the obvious importance of
the topic to shareholders.13 A proposal in this area, therefore, can only
be made through a separate proxy solicitation or from the floor of the
meeting; reliance on Rule 14a-8 is entirely foreclosed. Yet when the
proposal is made from the floor, management routinely obtains the
discretionary voting authority to ensure defeat.14
This Article will trace the evolution of discretionary voting power
under the proxy rules. The history is one of continuous expansion of
the company’s right to such authority. The Article will discuss the
imperfect, indeed ineffective, mechanisms that can be used to prevent
the transfer of discretionary voting authority from shareholders to
management. Finally, the Article will examine possible changes in the
regulatory regime that can address these concerns.
II. THE ANNUAL MEETING PROCESS
The requirements for shareholder meetings are governed by state
law. For shareholders who cannot or will not physically attend the
12

See Shareholder Developments During the 2015 Proxy Season, GIBSON DUNN (July 15,
2015),
http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Pages/Shareholder-ProposalDevelopments-During-the-2015-Proxy-Season.aspx (noting that issuers filed requests
with the SEC to omit proposals with respect to 318 out of the 943 proposals submitted
by shareholders).
13
See infra Section V.
14
See State Street Corp., Proxy Solicitation Material (Schedule 14A), at 26 (March
2003),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/93751/000009375103000018/proxy2003
.htm (“The Board of Directors does not know of any other matters that may be
presented for action at the meeting, except that management has been informed that
stockholders intend to submit a proposal to amend the By-Laws of the Corporation . . .
If the proposal is properly brought before the meeting by the stockholders, the proxy
holders intend to use their discretionary authority to vote against the proposal.”). The
proposal was made at the meeting and was defeated by a vote of 289,214,115 to 170
(with 1,231 shares abstaining or not voting). See State Street Corp., Quarterly Report
(Form
10-Q),
at
34
(Mar.
31,
2003),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/93751/000092701603002508/d10q.htm.
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meeting, voting takes place through the proxy process. For public
companies, the proxy process is regulated by federal law and overseen
by the SEC.15
A. State Law Requirements
Companies typically hold an annual meeting of shareholders at
which directors are elected.16 Shareholders receive notice of the
meeting and have the right to attend and vote their shares.17 For those
present at the meeting, shares are typically voted by ballot.18
Shareholders may also designate a proxy or agent to attend the
meeting and vote the shares in accordance with their instructions.19
Shareholders in attendance can nominate directors or make
proposals from the floor of the meeting.20 Described as a “default
rule,”21 the right to present business at the meeting is a mix of common
and statutory law.22 Shareholders do not, however, have an unlimited
15

See 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14a-1 to 14b-2 (2012).
See Hoschett v. TSI Int’l Software, Ltd., 683 A.2d 43, 44 (Del. Ch. 1996) (“The
obligation to hold an annual meeting at which directors are to be elected, either for
one year or for staggered terms, as the charter may provide, is one of the very few
mandatory features of Delaware corporation law.”).
17
Fisch, supra note 1, at 1136 (“Presence at the annual meeting carries with it
certain common-law rights, such as the right to nominate a candidate for the board of
directors or to propose resolutions or transactions within the authority of the
shareholders, such as a shareholder resolution or bylaw amendment.”).
18
See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211(e) (2009) (providing that all elections to the
board shall be by ballot). See also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 231(b) (2000) (requiring
inspector of election to determine “the shares represented at a meeting and the
validity of proxies and ballots” to “[c]ount all votes and ballots” and to “[c]ertify their
determination of the number of shares represented at the meeting, and their count of
all votes and ballots”). Proxy cards do not give to owners the same degree of choice.
See infra note 168.
19
See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 7.22(a) (2016) (allowing a shareholder to vote
shares “in person or by proxy”).
20
See Stewart J. Schwab & Randall S. Thomas, Realigning Corporate Governance:
Shareholder Activism by Labor Unions, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1018, 1066 (1998) (“Under state
law, labor and other shareholders can submit proposals for shareholder approval at
the annual shareholders’ meeting, subject to compliance with any applicable bylaw
provisions.”).
21
JANA Master Fund, Ltd. v. CNET Networks, Inc., 954 A.2d 335, 344 (Del. Ch.
2008) (“CNET is correct that . . . if the Notice Bylaw is interpreted to apply only to 14a8 proposals, then ‘any of CNET’s thousands of stockholders are free to raise for the
first time and present any proposals they desire at the Annual Meeting.’ Although this
may sound daunting, it is the default rule in Delaware.”), aff’d, 947 A.2d 1120 (Del.
2008).
22
George Ponds Kobler, Shareholder Voting Over the Internet: A Proposal for Increasing
Shareholder Participation in Corporate Governance, 49 ALA. L. REV. 673, 675 (1998) (“State
common law and statutory law gave shareholders the right to make proposals and vote
at corporation meetings.”). Delaware provides that in addition to the election of
16
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right to make proposals. Proposals can be ruled out of order to the
extent they are inconsistent with the law or otherwise in violation of
applicable bylaws and charter provisions.23 The degree to which bylaws
can impose limits on these common law rights by, for example,
requiring a minimum share ownership threshold,24 is unclear.25
The most common restriction imposed by management on
shareholder proposals concerns advance notice requirements.26
Companies usually require that shareholders provide notice of any

directors “[a]ny other proper business may be transacted at the annual meeting.” See
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211(e) (2009). Some types of proposals appear expressly
authorized by statute. This includes, for example, the right of shareholders to propose
bylaws. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(a) (2009) (“After a corporation other than a
nonstock corporation has received any payment for any of its stock, the power to adopt,
amend or repeal bylaws shall be in the stockholders entitled to vote.”). See also
Hoschett v. TSI Int’l Software, Ltd., 683 A.2d 43, 45 (Del. Ch. 1996) (“[T]he purposes
served by the annual meeting include affording to shareholders an opportunity to
bring matters before the shareholder body, as provided by the corporations charter
and bylaws, such as bylaw changes.”).
23
Note, Proxy Rule 14a-8: Omission of Shareholder Proposals, 84 HARV. L. REV. 700,
702–03 (1971) (“Stockholders have no right, however, to obtain discussion or a vote
on every proposal, since the chairman of the meeting may rule a proposal out of order
if the proposal is not a proper subject for shareholder action under state law or the
charter or by-laws of the company.”).
24
Ashford Hospitality Prime, Inc., Proxy Solicitation Material (Schedule 14A), at
45
(May
12,
2015),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1574085/000104746915003607/a222422
9zdef14a.htm (seeking shareholder approval of bylaw that would limit nominees and
proposals to shareholders “of record” that owned at least 1 percent of the shares
continuously for at least one year). The proposal, however, was not approved by
shareholders. See Ashford Hospitality Prime, Inc., Current Report
(Form
8-K)
(May
18,
2015),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1574085/000157408515000037/ahp2015
annualshareholdervo.htm (For: 3,420,750; Against: 15,309,178; Abstain: 15,499;
Broker non-votes: 1,992,587). A majority of shareholders also voted against the
proposal at Ashford Hospitality Trust. See Ashford Hospitality Trust, Current Report
(Form
8-K)
(May
12,
2015),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1232582/000123258215000079/aht2015
annualshareholdervo.htm.
25
Some have argued that they have the right to impose limits on these types of
rights. See Susan W. Liebeler, A Proposal to Rescind the Shareholder Proposal Rule, 18 GA.
L. REV. 425, 463 (1984) (“A bylaw provision requiring minimum share ownership in
order to bring matters before the shareholders meeting of a for-profit corporation
would appear even more likely to withstand judicial scrutiny. If the bylaws of such a
corporation required five percent share ownership in order to bring a matter before
the meeting, a proposal from a shareholder holding fewer shares would be an
improper matter for shareholder action under state law.”).
26
See CNET Networks, Inc., 954 A.2d at 344 (“An advance notice bylaw is one that
requires stockholders wishing to make nominations or proposals at a corporation’s
annual meeting to give notice of their intention in advance of so doing.”).
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impending proposal several months before the meeting.27
A
shareholder who fails to provide the requisite advance notice may be
barred from making the proposal.28
B. Shareholder Proposals and the Proxy Rules
Public companies are subject to the federal proxy rules.29 Rule
14a-8 permits shareholders to include in the company’s proxy
statement a properly submitted proposal. Management, in turn, must
provide shareholders with the right to vote for or against the matter.30
Those submitting a proposal are required to attend the meeting and
“present” the matter from the floor.31
At one time, the requirements of Rule 14a-8 largely coexisted with
those set out under state law. The initial version of the rule allowed
for the submission of a proposal by any shareholder, without reference
to a minimum ownership threshold or holding period.32 Proposals
were to be included so long as they constituted a proper subject for
shareholders,33 a standard that turned on state law.34
The overlap, however, did not last. With the adoption of the first
significant set of amendments to the rule in 1948,35 the Commission
27

See Harbinger Capital Partners Fund I, Ltd. v. Nw. Corp., No. 1937-N, 2006 WL
572823, at *1 (Del. Ch. Feb. 23, 2006) (bylaw requiring shareholder “to identify its
slate of proposed board candidates three months in advance of the meeting”).
28
In the absence of these types of provisions, any of a company’s “thousands of
stockholders are free to raise for the first time and present any proposals they desire
at the Annual Meeting.” CNET Networks, Inc., 954 A.2d at 344.
29
See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, § 14(a), 48 Stat. 895 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78n (2012)) (proxy rules apply to companies registered under
Section 12 of the Exchange Act).
30
17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(a) (2012). The impetus for the rule, however, did not
arise from the desire to enhance the right of shareholders. Instead, the provision was
primarily designed to alleviate management’s obligation to disclose an impending
shareholder proposal in the proxy statement. See Brown, The Evolving Role of Rule 14a8, supra note 10, at 153. By allowing shareholders to submit the proposal for inclusion
in the proxy statement, the Rule effectively shifted the disclosure obligations to the
proponent.
31
See Rule 14a-8(h), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(h) (2012).
32
See Exchange Act Release No. 3347, 1942 WL 34864 (Dec. 18, 1942).
33
Id.
34
Opinion of Baldwin B. Bane, Exchange Act Release No. 3638, 1945 WL 27415,
at *2 (Jan. 3, 1945) (“Speaking generally, it is the purpose of Rule X-14A-7 to place
stockholders in a position to bring before their fellow stockholders matters of concern
to them as stockholders in such corporation; that is, such matters relating to the affairs
of the company concerned as are proper subjects for stockholders’ action under the
laws of the state under which it is organized.”).
35
Adoption of Amendments to Proxy Rules, Exchange Act Release No. 4185, 1948
WL 28695 (Nov. 5, 1948). For a discussion of the 1948 amendments, see Brown, The
Evolving Role of Rule 14a-8, supra note 10, at 154.
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began to impose conditions that deviated significantly from the
requirements of state law.36 The number of exclusions grew from one
to thirteen; eligibility was made contingent upon stock holdings and
tenure.37 Moreover, while the changes had a variety of explanation, at
least some were apparently designed to reduce shareholder access to
Rule 14a-8.38 As a result, increasingly broad categories of proposals
were eligible for omission from the proxy statement but were
permissible under state law and could be raised from the floor of the
meeting.
III. SHAREHOLDER VOTING RIGHTS AND THE PROXY CARD
For shareholders of public companies unable or unwilling to
attend the meeting,39 voting typically occurs through the execution of
a proxy card.40 The card designates a third party to attend the meeting
and vote the shares as instructed. Because the card usually comes from
management, the third party is invariably appointed by the company
and is often an officer.41
36

The evolution of these changes is discussed in Brown, The Evolving Role of Rule
14a-8, supra note 10.
37
See Rule 14a-8(b), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(b) (2012) (requiring shareholder to
“have continuously held at least $2,000 in market value, or 1%, of the company’s
securities entitled to be voted on the proposal at the meeting for at least one year”);
id. § 240.14a-8(h)(1)–(13) (listing thirteen exclusions). These requirements and
restrictions were generally required under state law. See Fisch, supra note 1, at 1149
(“No uniform state or common law principle requires that a shareholder hold one
percent or one thousand dollars’ worth of a corporation’s stock for a minimum of one
year before making a motion at a shareholders’ meeting. No state law bars a
shareholder from making the same motion or proposal in successive years, yet Rule
14a-8(c)(12) limits a shareholder’s ability to do so. Additionally, state law does not
restrict shareholders to dealing with issues concerning more than five percent of the
corporation’s total assets or extraordinary business matters. The SEC, however, has
imposed these limits on shareholder democracy.”).
38
Fisch, supra note 1, at 1149 (“Many of the restrictions imposed by the proxy
rules can be attributed to a pragmatic effort by the SEC to limit the number of
shareholder proposals and to restrict use of the proxy statement to issues of general
importance to shareholders.”).
39
In addition to the costs of attending, institutional investors holding shares in a
large number of issuers would need to physically attend a large number of meetings
in a short period of time. See infra note 118.
40
Listed companies are required to solicit proxies. See NYSE Rule 402.04(A),
http://nysemanual.nyse.com/lcm/sections/lcmsections/chp_1_5/chp_1_5_2/default.asp (“Actively operating companies are
required to solicit proxies for all meetings of shareholders.”). Of course, most owners
today hold shares in street name accounts and execute voting instructions. These
documents are not proxies but are sent to brokers (or their agents) and eventually
transferred to a proxy card. See discussion at infra Part IV.D.
41
See Whole Foods Mkt., Inc., Proxy Statement (July 30, 2015), at 3,
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/865436/000120677415002458/wholefood
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Under Rule 14a-4,42 the proxy card must “identify clearly and
impartially each separate matter intended to be acted upon, whether
or not related to or conditioned on the approval of other matters, and
whether proposed” by the company or shareholders.43 Shareholders
are to be “afforded an opportunity to specify by boxes” the choice of
approval, disapproval, or abstention from “each separate matter. . . .”44
Shares reflected in the proxy card are voted at the meeting “by means
of a ballot.”45 The proxy can only be used for a single meeting and any
adjournment.46

s_def14a.htm (“If you grant a proxy, the persons named as proxy holders, John Mackey
and Walter Robb, will have the discretion to vote your shares on any additional matters
properly presented for a vote at the meeting in accordance with Texas law and our
Bylaws.”). Both were officers of the company. Id. (“John Mackey and Walter Robb are
officers of the Company and were named by our Board of Directors as proxy holders.
They will vote all proxies, or record an abstention or withholding, in accordance with
the directions on the proxy. If no contrary direction is given, the shares will be voted
as recommended by the Board of Directors.”).
42
The early rules indicated that companies soliciting proxies had to provide
shareholders with a “definite means” to vote. See Exchange Act Release No. 1823, 1938
WL 33169, at *1 (Aug. 11, 1938) (“In other words, the proxy must provide some
definite means whereby the security holder may indicate how he desires his vote to be
cast on a given proposition and whereby the authority of the holders of the proxy will
be limited accordingly.”). The need for a “definite means” of voting in the “form of
proxy or otherwise” proved to be subject to abuse. See Exchange Act Release No. 2771,
1941 WL 36908, at *1 (Feb. 8, 1941) (“Some corporations have followed the practice
of enclosing with the proxy a separate slip of paper on which security holders may
indicate their vote. The Commission has been informed that this practice has led to
confusion in the minds of security holders, in that many did not understand that it was
necessary to return two separate instruments to the corporation in order to specify
their vote.”). The Commission, therefore, mandated that voting take place on the
proxy card. Id. (“The proxy form itself is the generally accepted instrument through
which a stockholder gives authority to persons to represent him at the meeting. The
Commission knows of no valid practical reason for separating the vote from the proxy
itself. It is of the opinion that the separate slip has been used in order to discourage
security holders from exercising their voting privileges. The Commission has
therefore decided to amend its rules to require that the space to specify the action
desired shall be included in the form of proxy itself.”).
43
17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-4(a)(3) (2012). See also Exchange Act Release No. 1823,
1938 WL 33169, at *1 (Aug. 11, 1938) (companies must provide a mechanism for
shareholders to “indicate how he desires his vote to be cast on a given proposition and
whereby the authority of the holders of the proxy will be limited accordingly”).
44
The requirements with respect to the election of directors are somewhat
different. For example, shareholders do not have the right to vote against but may
“withhold authority” for each nominee. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-4(b) (2012). But see
17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-4(b) (“If applicable state law gives legal effect to votes cast against
a nominee, then in lieu of, or in addition to, providing a means for security holders to
withhold authority to vote, the registrant should provide a similar means for security
holders to vote against each nominee.”).
45
17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-4(e) (2012).
46
Id. § 240.14a-4(d).
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The rule, therefore, presupposes that shareholders will be given a
choice on all matters to be voted upon at the meeting and that their
shares will only be voted in accordance with the choices made on the
proxy card. In fact, however, the rule does not operate in such a
fashion. In at least two instances, a company may vote an owner’s
shares without instruction.
First, a proxy may provide management with the authority to vote
the portions of the card deliberately left blank by the shareholder.47
Second, companies can use the card to obtain discretionary authority
to vote on matters not listed on the proxy card. This includes proposals
that management knows will be made from the floor well in advance
of the meeting.
A. Partially Completed Proxy Cards
Rule 14a-4 provides management with the authority to vote any
portion of the proxy card left blank by the shareholder. First
authorized in 1938,48 management gained the right to vote for matters
“not specified” by the shareholder “provided that the form of proxy
states in bold-face type how it is intended to vote the shares
represented by the proxy in each such case.”49 Management only had
to disclose a “bona fide intention” with respect to the unmarked
portions of the proxy card, something that could presumably be
changed “[i]f later events” made it “unwise to vote in the manner
stated. . . .”50
The Commission justified the approach as a
“convenience” for shareholders.51 Aware that the company would vote
the shares in favor of management, shareholders benefited by avoiding
the need to execute the entire card.52 Almost from the beginning,
47

See infra notes 48–59.
Exchange Act Release No. 1823, 1938 WL 33169, at *3 (Aug. 11, 1938)
(“Nothing in Regulation X-14 shall prevent the solicitation of a proxy conferring
discretionary authority with respect to matters . . . not known or determined at the
time of the solicitation, or with respect to elections of directors or other officials.”).
49
17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-4(b)(1) (2012).
50
Notice of Proposal to Revise Proxy Rules, Exchange Act Release No. 3998, 1947
WL 25504, at *1 (Oct. 10, 1947) (“The requirements as to the form of proxy have been
amended to provide that where a security holder does not mark the ballot, the proxy
holder is required to state only his bona fide intention as to the way in which the shares
represented by the proxy will be voted. If later events make it unwise to vote in the
manner stated, the proxy holder may then vote the shares in his discretion.”).
51
Christie Nicks, Note, Voting Partially Instructed Shares by Brokers, 91 DENV. L. REV.
ONLINE 155, 161 (2014) (“The authority apparently arose from the belief that a blank
item on the proxy was deliberate and reflected an intention by shareholders to support
management.”),
http://www.denverlawreview.org/dlronlinearticle/2014/4/19/voting-of-partially-instructed-shares-by-brokers.html.
52
Shareholder Communications, Shareholder Participation in the Corporate
48
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however, shareholders objected to the “convenience” as inconsistent
with their actual intent.53 Eventually, the Commission proposed to do
away with the authority.54 Issuers, however, objected, asserting that
shareholders benefited from the status quo,55 would be harmed by the
change56 and, in any event, would require “extensive reeducation” to
adjust to any amendments.57 The Commission left the authority in
Electoral Process and Corporate Governance Generally, Exchange Act Release No.
16104, 1979 WL 170069, at *5 (Aug. 13, 1979) (proposing release) (“Certain
commentators, noting that shareholders are advised how unmarked proxies will be
voted, concluded that the affirmative acts of signing the proxy card and returning it to
the issuer were substantial evidence of a shareholder’s intention to grant the issuer
authority to vote his shares.”).
53
U.S. Secs. & Exch. Comm’n, Summary of Proposed Revision of Proxy Rules
(Aug.
15,
1942),
http://3197d6d14b5f19f2f4405e13d29c4c016cf96cbbfd197c579b45.r81.cf1.rackcdn.com/collection/papers/1940/
1942_0819_SECProxyT.pdf (“Under the present rules, a number of managements
have drafted proxies so that the failure of a security holder to indicate how he desired
his vote cast on a particular proposal vested authority in the management to vote the
proxy in support of its position on the proposal. Many investors have commented that
management should be permitted to vote only those proxies specifically marked. It is
proposed that this suggestion be adopted as part of the amended rules.”). See also
Exchange Act Release No. 16104, 1979 WL 170069, at *5 (Aug. 13, 1979) (“[S]everal
other commentators objected to permitting issuers to vote unmarked proxies. . . . Such
a result may not be consistent with the intent of shareholders and could dilute the
meaning of the vote conveyed to the issuer’s board of directors.”).
54
See Exchange Act Release No. 16104, 1979 WL 170069 (Aug. 13, 1979)
(proposing release). See also Shareholder Communications, Shareholder Participation
in the Corporate Electoral Process and Corporate Governance Generally, Exchange
Act Release No. 16356, 1979 WL 173198, at *8 (Nov. 21, 1979) (adopting release)
(“Rule 14a-4(b)(3), as proposed, would have prohibited a form of proxy from
conferring discretionary authority to vote with respect to any matter as to which the
security holder is afforded an opportunity to specify a choice and no specification has
been made.”).
55
Exchange Act Release No. 16356, 1979 WL 173198, at *8 (Nov. 21, 1979)
(adopting release) (“A few corporations also were concerned that disregarding
unmarked proxies would tend to increase artificially the percentage of votes cast in
favor of shareholder proposals, which might result in adoption of special interest
proposals not supported by security holders on the whole.”).
56
Id. (“Most commentators who opposed the proposed rule asserted that a
significant number of proxies are returned each year signed but unmarked and
believed that there is little reason to doubt that shareholders intend an unmarked
proxy to be voted for management’s positions.”). Unsurprisingly, shareholders had a
different perspective. Id. (“One shareholder contended that an unmarked proxy
evidenced a desire to have the security holder’s vote counted only for purposes of
achieving a quorum at the meeting of security holders. Shareholder intentions are
unclear, according to another commentator, because some companies ‘attempt to
make return of a signed and dated proxy card as automatic and unthinking a process
as possible.’”).
57
Id. (“Commentators foresaw numerous problems if the rule were adopted as
proposed. Chief among their concerns was the fear that shareholders would continue
to return unmarked proxies intending to grant voting authority to the proxy. In the
opinion of many commentators, extensive re-education efforts would be needed to
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place58 and merely admonished companies to “make greater efforts to
encourage securities holders to vote on the matters to be considered
at the meeting.”59
B. Discretionary Authority
Perhaps the most significant diminution of shareholder voting
rights, however, arose from the involuntary transfer of discretionary
authority from shareholders to management. For matters not set out
in the proxy card, companies could obtain the right, with proper
disclosure, to vote the shares at their discretion. The card itself
presented no opportunity to block the transfer. Shareholders could
only do so by failing to return the proxy to the company or engaging
in a counter solicitation.
1. Rule 14a-4(c)(1): “Unexpected” Matters
The earliest version of the proxy rules allowed management to
obtain discretionary authority for matters not known at the time of the
distribution of the proxy materials.60 As one commentator described,
the provision “provide[d] companies and other soliciting persons
some flexibility to cope with the emergence of unanticipated matters
that arise shortly before or during the meeting.”61 The authority was
not, however, automatic.62 Shareholders had to be informed in “boldalter this traditional mode of shareholder response.”).
58
The release acknowledged the benefits accorded management. See id. at *9
(“The Commission is sensitive to the possibility that adoption of the rule, as proposed,
could impede attainment of a specified percentage of votes needed to adopt measures
important to issuers’ operations.”).
59
Id. (“The help minimize[s] the number of abstentions when significant
proposals recommended by the board of directors are voted upon and to clarify the
meaning of signed but unmarked proxies, the Commission requests issuers to make
greater efforts to encourage security holders to vote on the matters to be considered
at the meeting.”). For a discussion of the voting of partially executed voting instruction
forms, see Christie Nicks, Note, Voting Partially Instructed Shares by Brokers, 91 DENV. L.
REV.
ONLINE
155
(2014),
http://www.denverlawreview.org/dlronlinearticle/2014/4/19/voting-of-partially-instructed-shares-by-brokers.html.
60
See Exchange Act Release No. 1823, 1938 WL 33169 (Aug. 11, 1938). The
authority was not intended to apply to a proposal made by the solicitor of the proxy.
See Aegis Corp. v. Goldman, 523 F. Supp. 1273, 1279 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (“The general
counsel of the S.E.C. has submitted a letter in support of plaintiff’s application. Letter
from Ralph E. Ferrara, Office of the General Counsel, to Judge Vincent L. Broderick
(July 21, 1981). . . . He urges that Rule 14a-4(c) (1) should be so interpreted that it
does not authorize the invocation of discretionary authority to vote for proposals made
by the proxy solicitor or proxy holder himself.”).
61
Schwab & Thomas, supra note 20, at 1066–67.
62
Aegis, 523 F. Supp. at 1278 (“Thus a proxy confers specific authority to vote with
respect to the matters specifically designated therein, and it may (but need not) confer
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faced type” on the surface of the proxy card.63 Nonetheless, companies
routinely obtained the authority.64
The use of discretionary authority allowed management, not
shareholders, to determine the outcome of motions to adjourn and
other unexpected items that could arise at the meeting. Particularly
with respect to procedural matters, the transfer of authority had a
certain logic. Rather than leave decisions to the random owners who
happened to be at the meeting, the power resided in managers who
also had a legal obligation to act in the best interests of shareholders.65
Companies eventually obtained the explicit authority to vote on a
variety of non-substantive matters, including approval of the minutes66
and anything “incident to the conduct of the meeting.”67
discretionary authority to vote with respect to various specified other matters.”).
63
Exchange Act Release No. 3347, 1942 WL 34864, at *8 (Dec. 18, 1942)
(“Nothing in Regulation X-14 shall prevent the solicitation of a proxy conferring
discretionary authority with respect to matters as to which the person solicited does
not make the specification provided for above if the ballot is clearly set forth in the
form of proxy and the form of proxy contains a statement in bold-face type indicating
that if the ballot is not marked the shares represented by the proxy will nevertheless
be voted in a specified manner.”). See also Frank D. Emerson & Franklin C. Latcham,
SEC Proxy Regulation: Steps Toward More Effective Stockholder Participation, 59 YALE L.J. 635,
663 (1950) (“But it did amend the X-14A-4(c) requirements with respect to matters
which the solicitor is not aware at the time of the solicitation are to be presented,
provided that a specific statement is made to that effect in the proxy form or
statement.”).
64
See Comm. for New Mgmt. of Guar. Bancshares Corp. v. Dimeling, 772 F. Supp.
230, 238 (E.D. Pa. 1991) (“The Committee proxy card contained the following line:
‘In their discretion, the proxyholders are authorized to vote upon such other business
as may properly come before the meeting.’ The vesting of discretionary authority in
proxyholders is standard. Indeed, it is advisable since any shareholder may introduce
a question to be voted upon at a shareholder’s meeting.”).
65
See J. Robert Brown, Jr., The Irrelevance of State Corporate Law in the Governance of
Public Companies, 38 U. RICH. L. REV. 317, 318 (2004) (delineating fiduciary obligations
of the board of directors). The Commission also took steps to prevent the authority
from being manipulated. The party soliciting proxies could not use the discretionary
authority to support their own initiatives. Proxy Rules – Comprehensive Review,
Exchange Act Release No. 23789, 1986 WL 722059, at *4 (Nov. 10, 1986) (noting that
the purpose of the discretionary authority provision was “only to allow the party filing
the proxy statement to respond to proposals initiated by others”). See also Marshall &
Ilsley Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1984 WL 45426 (July 12, 1984) (declining to issue
no action relief with respect to a shareholder resolution and that “[i]n reaching this
conclusion, we have especially noted that this matter as to which discretionary
authority was exercised in the voting of proxies solicited by the Company’s Board was
a matter proposed by the Board itself”).
66
17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-4(c)(4) (2012).
67
Id. § 240.14a-4(c)(7). The rules also permitted the exercise of discretionary
authority when bona fide replacement candidates were nominated to replace those
disclosed in the proxy materials. See id. § 240.14a-4(c)(5). These additions to the rule
reflected administrative practice. See Adoption of Amendments to Proxy Rules and
Information Rules, Exchange Act Release No. 8206, 1967 WL 88215, at *1 (Dec. 14,
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The right to vote on a discretionary basis with respect to other
types of “unexpected” matters, however, remained. Moreover,
companies were allowed to treat as “unknown” matters actually known
to management long before the meeting date. Initially, discretionary
authority could only be obtained for matters unknown “at the time the
solicitation [was] made. . . .”68 The language eventually changed to
proposals unknown a “reasonable time” before the solicitation.69 The
staff narrowly interpreted the requirement and declined to allow the
use of discretionary authority where management learned of a
proposal twelve days before the meeting.70
Eventually, however, “reasonable time” transformed into forty-five
days before the distribution of proxy materials from the prior year or
the date specified in an advance notice bylaw.71 Although described as
a “benefit” to shareholders,72 the change effectively meant that
1967) (“Administrative practice of the Commission has heretofore permitted a proxy
to confer discretionary authority with respect to the approval of the minutes of a prior
meeting where such approval does not amount to ratification of action taken at such
meeting, with respect to matters incident to the conduct of the meeting, and with
respect to the election of any person to any office for which a bona fide nominee is
named in the proxy statement and such nominee is unable to serve or for good cause
will not serve.”).
68
Adoption of Amendments to Proxy Rules, Exchange Act Release No. 4185, 1948
WL 28695 (Nov. 5, 1948).
69
Amendment of Proxy Rules, Exchange Act Release No. 4775, 1952 WL 5254, at
*4 (Dec. 11, 1952) (“A proxy may confer discretionary authority with respect to other
matters which may come before the meeting, provided the persons on whose behalf
the solicitation is made are not aware a reasonable time prior to the time the
solicitation is made that any such other matters are to be presented for action at the
meeting and provided further that a specific statement to that effect is made in the
proxy statement or in the form of proxy.”).
70
Larkin v. Baltimore Bancorp, 769 F. Supp. 919, 925 (D. Md. 1991) (quoting
statement from Gregg W. Corso, Special Counsel, Office of Tender Offers, SEC, May
14, 1991) (internal quotations omitted) (“Consistent with Rule 14a–4, a solicitor may
not exercise discretionary authority granted by a proxy with respect to matters known
a reasonable time prior to the meeting. Exercising discretionary authority with respect
to matters known twelve days prior to the meeting does not appear consistent with the
requirements of the rule. . . .”). Management could rely on discretionary authority if
providing shareholders who had already returned a proxy card with an opportunity to
revoke the authority. See United Mine Workers of Am. v. Pittson Co., No. 89-0962,
1989 WL 201060, at *3 (D.D.C. Nov. 24, 1989) (Letter from William E. Morley, Chief
Counsel, Division of Corporation Finance, to John E. Young (June 7, 1989)) (“It is the
staff’s view, however, that where the management is made aware of the matter in
sufficient time before the meeting, there are two options available: either the new
matter is reflected on a new proxy card and the security holders thus are given the
opportunity to revoke previously given discretionary authority as to the matter or it is
not added and the discretionary authority does not apply to the matter.”).
71
See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c)(1) (2012).
72
Amendments to Rules on Shareholder Proposals, Exchange Act Release No.
39093, 1997 WL 578696, at *21 (Sept. 18, 1997) (asserting that the adoption of a 45-
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proposals submitted well before the meeting73 could be treated as
“unknown” for purposes of the exercise of discretionary authority.74
2. Rule 14a-4(c)(6): Proposals “Omitted” under Rule 14a-8
In addition to “unknown” matters, companies were allowed to use
discretionary authority to vote against proposals that were in fact
entirely known. Rule 14a-8 required shareholders in most cases to
submit proposals to management 120 days prior to the date the proxy
materials were distributed the previous year.75 As a result, management
became aware of a proposal well before the annual meeting.
Even when timely, however, not all of these proposals ended up
in the proxy statement. In some cases, the Commission issued a noday time period would “not only provide clearer guidelines for shareholders and
companies, but also benefit investors by helping to ensure that companies are notified
of proposals sufficiently in advance of the annual meeting to provide shareholders a
meaningful opportunity to review related disclosures in the proxy statement”).
73
See Harbinger Capital Partners Fund I, Ltd. v. Nw. Corp., No. 1937-N, 2006 WL
572823 (Del. Ch. Feb. 23, 2006).
74
The release included one example. See Amendments to Rules on Shareholder
Proposals, Exchange Act Release No. 40018, 1998 WL 254809, at *6 (May 21, 1998)
(“As an example, assume a company mailed this year’s proxy materials on March 31,
1998 for an annual meeting on May 1, 1998. Next year, the company also schedules
an early May annual meeting. The notice date established by new rule 14a-4(c)(1) for
non-14a-8 proposals is forty-five calendar days before March 31, or February 14. Thus
February 14, 1999 would represent the notice date for the purposes of amended rule
14a-4(c)(1) unless a different date is established by an overriding advance notice
provision in the company’s charter or bylaws.”).
75
See Rule 14a-8(e), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(e) (2012). The period has been steadily
lengthened over the years. See Amendments to Rule 14a-8 Under the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 Relating to Proposals by Security Holders, Exchange Act Release
No. 20091, 1983 WL 33272, at *4 (Aug. 16, 1983) (extending the deadline for
submitting proposals from 90 days to 120 in order to “to give issuers and the
Commission’s staff adequate time to process proposals”); Adoption of Amendments
Relating to Proposals by Security Holders, Exchange Act Release No. 19771, 1976 WL
160347, at *4 (Nov. 22, 1976) (extending the deadline for submitting proposals from
70 to 90 days and noting that the Commission “believes that the inconvenience will be
minimal and is outweighed by the fact that the new timeliness deadlines will provide
an additional 20 days for proponents to explore all possible alternatives in connection
with a management’s intention to omit their proposals”); Title 17—Commodity and
Securities Exchanges, Chapter II—Securities and Exchange Commission, Exchange
Act Release No. 9784, 1972 WL 125400, at *2 (Sept. 22, 1972) (extending the deadline
for submitting proposals from 60 to 70 days, a change described as “technical in
nature”); Adoption of Amendments to Proxy Rules, Exchange Act Release No. 4979,
1954 WL 5772, at *1 (Jan. 6, 1954) (increasing the period from 30 to 60 days “so as to
give more time for the consideration of security holder proposals”). For most annual
meetings, proposals must be submitted no earlier than 120 days from the date of
distribution of the proxy materials during the prior year. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(e)(2)
(2012). Where the company did not hold an annual meeting or has changed the
meeting date by more than 30 days, “the deadline is a reasonable time before the
company begins to print and send its proxy materials.” Id.
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action letter authorizing omission.76 In other instances, shareholders
withdrew the proposal voluntarily. Omission or withdrawal under Rule
14a-8 did not preclude a shareholder from raising the same issue from
the floor of the meeting.77 As a result, companies confronted the risk
that a proposal not included in the proxy statement would nonetheless
be considered by shareholders at the upcoming meeting.
An early version of Rule 14a-478 allowed management to obtain
discretionary authority to vote against proposals omitted under Rule
14a-8.79 To do so, the company only had to disclose the intended use
of the authority,80 although additional information was required where
76

For a description of the no action letter process, see Courtney E. Bartkus, Note,
Appealing No-Action Responses under Rule 14a-8: Informal Procedures of the SEC and the
Availability of Meaningful Review, 93 DENV. L. REV. ONLINE 199 (2016),
http://www.denverlawreview.org/dlr-onlinearticle/2016/5/6/appealing-no-actionresponses-under-rule-14a-8-informal-proc.html.
77
See supra note 1. See also Exchange Act Release No. 39093, 1997 WL 578696, at
*20 (Sept. 18, 1997) (“If a shareholder submits a proposal under rule 14a-8 to be
included in the company’s proxy materials, but the company properly excludes the
proposal, rule 14a-4(c)(4) permits the company to exercise discretionary voting
authority to vote uninstructed proxies against that proposal if the shareholder chooses
an alternative route for its presentation to a vote. The proponent may, for instance,
intend to present the proposal from the floor of the company’s annual meeting, or
solicit proxy votes independently by distributing its own proxy statement and form of
proxy.”).
78
Adoption of Amendments to Proxy Rules, Exchange Act Release No. 4185, 1948
WL 28695, at *1 (Nov. 5, 1948) (“Rule X-14A-4 is amended to provide that proposals
so omitted need not be referred to in the form of proxy and that the proxy may confer
discretionary authority with respect to such proposals.”).
79
The amendments were likely motivated by the simultaneous decision to expand
the number of substantive grounds for excluding a proposal. As originally drafted,
Rule 14a-8 (then X-14a-7) only allowed for the exclusion of proposals that were not
proper subjects for shareholder action. To the extent excluded on this basis,
shareholders presumably lacked the authority to make the same proposal at the annual
meeting. See, e.g., The Wash. Post Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 1973 SEC No-Act. LEXIS
1447, at *3 (Feb. 22, 1973) (proposal excluded because proposing shareholders lacked
the authority to vote on the matter; if proposal made at meeting, shareholder would
be “ruled out of order”). In 1948, however, the Commission added grounds for
exclusion that went beyond the boundaries of state law. The amendments, therefore,
raised the possibility that a proposal omitted under Rule 14a-8 could still be made from
the floor of the meeting. The amendments to Rule 14a-4 made certain that
management would have sufficient votes to ensure defeat of the proposal to the extent
that occurred.
80
Pacific Enters, SEC No-Action Letter, 1990 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 447, at *2 (Mar.
9, 1990) (“When a shareholder proposal has been excluded pursuant to the provisions
of rule 14a–8, the proposal may still be presented at the meeting. Thus, issuers’ proxy
statements should disclose the possibility that proposals omitted pursuant to rule 14a–
8 may be raised at the meeting and the proxies will be voted in the discretion of the
proxy holders.”). See also Schwab & Thomas, supra note 20, at 1071 (“If the company
intends to exercise discretionary authority to vote on the excluded proposal if it is
subsequently presented by the union on the floor at the meeting, however, then the
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management actually knew that a proposal would be made at the
meeting.81 The proxy card did not have to include any mechanism to
allow shareholders to withhold the transfer of discretionary authority
with respect to the omitted proposal.
Initially, discretionary authority could only be used to vote against
proposals omitted for substantive reasons.82 Amendments adopted in
1967, however, expanded the use of discretionary voting to proposals
omitted for any reason, including the failure to observe procedural
formalities.83 Management could, therefore, use the authority to vote
SEC has taken the position that the company must have disclosed fully in its proxy
statement the possibility that the excluded shareholder proposal might be raised at
the meeting and that, in such event, the proxy will be voted in the discretion of the
holder in order to exercise discretionary authority under this rule.”).
81
The staff sometimes comments on the level of disclosure associated with
discretionary authority. One example involved a back and forth between the Office of
Mergers & Acquisitions at the SEC and counsel for Hospitality Properties Trust. See
Letter from David L. Orlic, Special Counsel, Office of Mergers & Acquisitions, SEC, to
Mark L. Kleifges, Chief Fin. Officer, Hospitality Properties Trust (Mar. 11, 2015),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/945394/000000000015014590/filename
1.pdf; see also Letter from Margaret R. Cohen, Skadden, Arps, to David L. Orlic, Special
Counsel, Office of Mergers & Acquisitions, SEC (Mar. 16, 2015),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/
945394/000110465915019762/filename1.htm. After another letter from the staff (see
Letter from David L. Orlic, Special Counsel, Office of Mergers & Acquisitions, SEC, to
Mark L. Kleifges, Chief Fin. Officer, Hospitality Properties Trust (Mar. 18, 2015),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/
edgar/data/945394/000000000015016176/filename1.pdf), the company agreed to
increase the level of disclosure. See Letter from Thomas W. Greenberg, Skadden, Arps,
to
Office
of
Mergers
&
Acquisitions,
SEC
(Mar.
19,
2015),
https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/cf-noaction/2015/danaher-corporation051315-13e4-incoming.pdf. For the disclosure on the matter included in the proxy
statement, see Hospitality Properties Trust (Schedule 14A) (Mar. 19, 2015),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/945394/000104746915002486/a2223826
zprer14a.htm.
82
A proxy card could provide discretionary authority for any proposal “omitted
from the proxy statement and form of proxy pursuant to paragraph (c) of Rule X-14A8.” Rule X-14A-4(c), reprinted in Amendment of Proxy Rules, Exchange Act Release
No. 4775, 1952 WL 5254, at *2–19 (Dec. 11, 1952). Subsection (c) of Rule X-14A-8
permitted the exclusion of proposals to the extent involving a “personal claim or
redressing a personal grievance,” to the extent the shareholder failed to present the
proposal at two consecutive meetings, and upon resubmission of substantially the same
proposal without having obtained at least three percent of the votes cast. Id.
83
The changes were not in the proposing release. See Notice of Proposed
Amendments to Proxy Rules and Information Rules, Exchange Act Release No. 8000,
1966 WL 85608 (Dec. 5, 1966). See also Adoption of Amendments to Proxy Rules and
Information Rules, Exchange Act Release No. 8206, 1967 WL 88215, at *2 (Dec. 14,
1967) (“Heretofore, discretionary authority was permitted by this provision only with
respect to proposals omitted pursuant to paragraph (c) of Rule 14a-8. The
amendment will thus permit discretionary authority to vote with respect to proposals
which are not submitted within the period of time specified in the rule, as well as those
which may be omitted pursuant to paragraph (c), and with respect to proposals which
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against proposals excluded because the shareholders missed a
deadline or failed to provide adequate evidence of stock ownership.84
In addition, administrative interpretations broadened application of
the authority to proposals that did not explicitly invoke Rule 14a-885 or
were withdrawn before the staff ruled on the no action request.86
3. Rule 14a-4(c)(2): “Non-Rule 14a-8 Proposals”
Discretionary authority applied to matters “unknown” before the
meeting. The authority also applied to proposals “omitted” under
Rule 14a-8.87 For most of the existence of Rule 14a-4, however, timely
are false or misleading.”).
84
In addition to proposals omitted under Rule 14a-8, discretionary authority can
be used to vote against a proposal omitted under the antifraud provision contained in
Rule 14a-9. Rule 14a-4(c)(6), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-4(c)(6) (2012). See Exchange Act
Release No. 8206, 1967 WL 88215 (Dec. 14, 1967). Added in 1967, the provision
appears redundant. The right to exclude proposals for violations of Rule 14a-9 was
only added in 1976. See Adoption of Amendments Relating to Proposals by Security
Holders, Exchange Act Release No. 12999, 1976 WL 160347, at *9 (Nov. 22, 1976)
(noting that the provision “formalize[d] a ground for omission that the Commission
believes has been inherent in the proxy rules”). The change made the need for a
reference to Rule 14a-9 redundant. Nonetheless, retention of the language suggests
that a company can omit a proposal as misleading without relying on Rule 14a-8 and
use discretionary authority to vote against the matter if it is subsequently raised at the
meeting.
85
See Texaco, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1997 WL 64007, at *5 (Feb. 14, 1997)
(“Although the Proponent makes no reference to Rule 14a-8 in his letter (and does
not indicate a desire to have his two proposals included in the Company’s proxy
statement), Rule 14a-8 itself would require Texaco to include the proposals in its proxy
materials, unless the requirements in subparagraph (a) of Rule 14a-8 are not met or
one or more of the exceptions set forth in subparagraph (c) of Rule 14a-8 are
applicable. Accordingly, Texaco believes that for purposes of Rule 14a-4, Texaco’s
omission of these proposals from its proxy statement should be viewed as being
pursuant to Rule 14a-8.”).
86
Consolidated Freightways, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1995 WL 100550, at *1
(Mar. 8, 1995) (“Based upon the facts presented, the Division is of the view that
Company may in accordance with Rule 14a–4(c)(4), exercise discretionary authority
with respect to the shareholder proposals withdrawn by Messrs. Weaver and Boyle. In
arriving at this position, the Division has noted that the proposals were originally
submitted to the Company pursuant to Rule 14a–8 and that they were withdrawn after
the Company submitted its no-action request seeking to omit the proposals under the
cited provisions of Rule 14a–8.”).
87
Issuers sometimes argued that all proposals should be treated as submitted
under Rule 14a-8 for purposes of discretionary authority. Courts, however, rejected
the argument. See United Mine Workers of Am. v. Pittson Co., No. 89-0962, 1989 WL
201060, at *7 (D.D.C. Nov. 24, 1989) (“The Union’s effort was markedly different from
the stringent requirements of Rule 14a–8 to which Pittston asserts all proposals by
shareholders are subject. This is an extreme view and Pittston has been unable to
supply a single authority to support it. If true, the Court is confident that Pittston
would by no means be the first to have defended it. Furthermore, Pittston’s position
ignores the essence of the rule and the tradeoff that must be endured when it is
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submitted proposals disclaiming reliance on Rule 14a-8 (“Non-Rule
14a-8 Proposals”) were not subject to discretionary authority.88 Instead,
companies had to disclose the proposal in the proxy materials and
provide shareholders with an opportunity to vote on the matter.89
In the 1990s, however, the Commission, first by administrative
interpretation, then through amendment to the rule, reversed this
approach. In Idaho Power,90 the staff permitted a company to rely on
discretionary authority to vote against a Non-Rule 14a-8 Proposal91 so
long as companies “advised” shareholders about the matter92 and
specified how the shares would be voted.93 Shareholders could only
invoked by shareholders. Rule 14a–8 offers the proponent an opportunity for its
proposal to be contained in management’s own proxy statement at no expense to the
proponent. In return, the proponent must comply with Rule 14a–8’s strictures.”).
88
Emerson & Latcham, supra note 63, at 663 (“The Commission did not adopt
the 1948 proposal to modify the X-14A-4(b) provisions with reference to proxies
conferring upon a solicitor discretionary authority regarding matters which he knows
will be presented at the meeting.”).
89
See Schwab & Thomas, supra note 20, at 1061–62 (1998) (“If the company is
aware of the proposal sufficiently early, then it may choose to include the union’s
proposal and supporting statement in the company’s proxy materials, just as it would
any shareholder proposal. If the company decides to do this, however, ‘the proposal
is likely to get a high vote, comparable to any “normal” shareholder proposal.
Albertson’s and Questar handled union proposals this way [in 1996] . . . and the
proposals drew support ranging from 21% to 38%.’”).
90
Idaho Power Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 1996 WL 114545 (Mar. 13, 1996).
91
See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Bylaw Battlefield: Can Institutions Change the Outcome of
Corporate Control Contests?, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 605, 620 (1997) (“A 1996 no-action
letter, issued to the Idaho Power Company, is read by some practitioners to authorize
the issuer to utilize the discretionary voting authority granted it by the standard proxy,
notwithstanding Rule 14a-4, so long as the insurgent’s solicitation is limited and
management publicly states how it intends to vote on the issue.”); see also Schwab &
Thomas, supra note 20, at 1069 (“The SEC recently suggested, however, that
management does not always need to include a shareholder floor proposal on the
company’s ballot in order to exercise discretionary voting authority.”).
92
See Idaho Power Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 1996 WL 114545, at *1 (Mar. 13,
1996) (shareholders must be “advised by the company of the nature of the proposal
and how the company intends to vote with respect to the proposal”); see also BorgWarner Security Corporation, SEC No-Action Letter, 1996 WL 119943, at *1 (Mar. 14,
1996). At least one court indicated that this required disclosure of all “substantive”
aspects of the proposal. See Union of Needletrades, Indust. and Textile Emps. v. May
Dep’t Stores Co., 26 F. Supp. 2d 577, 581 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (“The defendant followed
the SEC’s recommended procedures by disclosing the substantive aspects of the
plaintiffs’ three proposals in May’s original proxy solicitation materials.”), aff’d, 171
F.3d 754 (2d. Cir. 1999).
93
See Amendments to Rules on Shareholder Proposals, Exchange Act Release No.
39093, 1997 WL 578696, at *21 (Sept. 18, 1997) (“Under those no-action letters, a
company that receives adequate advance notice of a non-rule 14a-8 proposal—such as
under its advance notice bylaw—nevertheless may preserve its discretionary voting
authority by disclosing in its proxy materials the nature of any proposal it has been
advised may be presented, and the manner in which the company intends to exercise
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prevent the use of discretionary authority by engaging in a counter
solicitation.94
The Commission eventually had second thoughts about the
approach and proposed to change the interpretation. Amendments
to Rule 14a-4 would have required that companies receiving “adequate
notice” of a proposal provide shareholders with the right to withhold
discretionary authority.95 Moreover, companies were required to
include “a discussion of the nature” of any proposal96 and provide
sufficient information to ensure that shareholders could make an
informed decision.97
The intended revision engendered substantial opposition.
Objections fell into two broad categories. Some focused on the
logistical consequences of the approach. Describing the amendment
as “troublesome,”98 they argued that the change would make the

its discretion.”).
94
See Idaho Power Co., supra note 90, at *1 (“Assuming Adequate Notice, a
company could not, however, exercise discretionary authority under Rule 14a-4(c)(1)
with respect to voting on any matter that is the subject of an opposing proxy solicitation
so long as the proponent delivers a proxy statement and form of proxy to holders of a
majority of the shares entitled to vote on the matter or, if a greater percentage is
required under applicable law to carry the proposal, holders of the minimum
required. In this circumstance, it is the Division’s view that the matter should be
reflected on the company’s proxy card. If not, discretionary authority would not apply
to the matter.”). See also Exchange Act Release No. 39093, 1997 WL 578696, at *21
(Sept. 18, 1997) (“Under the no-action letters, the company loses its voting discretion,
however, once the proponent commences a proxy solicitation and solicits the
percentage of holders required to carry the proposal.”).
95
Exchange Act Release No. 39093, 1997 WL 578696, at *22 (Sept. 18, 1997)
(“[T]he company would be required to provide shareholders who execute and return
proxies an opportunity to withhold discretionary authority, albeit only on those
matters for which it received adequate notice and which it described in its proxy
statement.”).
96
Id. (“The new rule would permit the exercise of such authority if the proxy
materials include: (i) in the proxy statement, a discussion of the nature of the matters
and how the company intends to exercise its discretion on each matter, and (ii) on
the proxy card, a cross-reference to the discussion in the proxy statement and a box
allowing shareholders to withhold discretionary authority from management to vote
on the same matter(s).”).
97
Id. (“Under that rule, companies must provide shareholders with sufficient
information to make informed voting decisions as well as a meaningful opportunity to
review the information.”).
98
Letter from D. Craig Nordlund, Chairman, Sec. Law Comm., Am. Soc’y of Corp.
Sec’y,
to
Jonathan
G.
Katz,
Sec’y,
SEC
(Dec.
8,
1997),
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s72597/nordlun1.htm [hereinafter Nordlund
Letter] (“Although we agree that there needs to be clarification of the rules
concerning a company’s discretion to vote uninstructed proxies when a proponent
chooses to act outside the scope of rule 14a-8, we find the proposed revision of rule
14a-4 to be especially troublesome.”).
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tallying process more complicated.99 Others expressed concern over
the degree of required disclosure100 and the difficulty of obtaining the
information needed for the proxy statement.101
Most of the comments, however, focused on the ability of
shareholders to avoid the limitations contained in Rule 14a-8.102
Although the rule was never intended to be the exclusive method for
making proposals, issuers and their supporters essentially claimed that
it was. Bringing proposals directly to the meeting amounted to an
“abuse”103 and a “back door” around the rule,104 rendering Rule 14a-8
99

Letter from Martin S. Wagner, Assoc. Gen. Counsel, Xerox, Inc., to Jonathan
G.
Katz,
Sec’y,
SEC
(Nov.
21,
1997),
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s72597/wagner1.htm
[hereinafter
Xerox
Letter] (“The addition of the box could create unnecessary complications in the
solicitation and proxy counting process.”). See also Letter from Alan Bulliner, Assoc.
Gen. Counsel, Burlington N. Santa Fe Corp., to Jonathan G. Katz, Sec’y, SEC (Dec. 31,
1997),
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s72597/morelan1.txt
[hereinafter
Burlington N. Santa Fe Letter] (“The Company is concerned that the proposed
revision would foist new burdens on companies while at the same time encourage
proposals which circumvent the 14a-8 process.”).
100
Burlington N. Santa Fe Letter, supra note 99 (allowing shareholders to withhold
discretionary authority for non-rule 14a-8 proposals would cause companies to “feel
compelled to provide greater discussion of the non-14a-8 proposal and, as a result,
encourage erosion of the entire 14a-8 process”). See also Letter from Alan Bulliner,
Assoc. Gen. Counsel, Bell Atlantic, to Jonathan G. Katz, Sec’y, SEC (Nov. 13, 1997),
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s72597/bulline1.txt [hereinafter Bell Atlantic
Letter] (“Also, referencing such a proposal in corporate proxy materials will no doubt
result in the inclusion of immaterial proposals at the expense of all shareholders.”).
101
Nordlund Letter, supra note 98 (“As proposed, companies would have the
burden of providing shareholders with sufficient information to make informed voting
decisions. Depending on the sophistication of the proponent and the coherence of
communication to the company about the proposal, this could be a difficult or
impossible requirement for a company to meet.”).
102
Nordlund Letter, supra note 98 (“We are concerned that under the proposed
changes, proponents would have complete flexibility to put matters before
shareholders free of all the reasonable requirements and restraints of rule 14a-8. For
example, proponents could submit as many proposals as they wish; there would be no
minimum share ownership requirement; resubmission thresholds would not apply;
and there would be no restriction on the nature of the subject matter that could be
presented.”). See also Xerox Letter, supra note 99 (“The potential effect of the
proposed changes in 14a-4 would be to tilt the playing field away from 14a-8 as a way
to avoid the criteria of that Rule. Thus, there would be no minimum share ownership
requirement, no resubmission thresholds and no restriction on the nature of the
subject matter that could be presented.”).
103
Burlington N. Santa Fe Letter, supra note 99 (“Submission of last minute
proposals can be especially vexing as a company finalizes its proxy materials. In recent
years, there appears to have been a proliferation of non-14a-8 proposals submitted for
tactical or harassment purposes. These efforts to avoid the procedural and substantive
requirements of Rule 14a-8 abuse the process.”).
104
Bell Atlantic Letter, supra note 100 (“The problem is that the proposed revision
would still permit shareholders to use Rule 14a-4(c) as a back door to force a proxy
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“useless.”105 As one company put it:
Our fear is that this amendment might have the
unintended effect of creating two distinct regulatory schemes
governing shareholder proposals.
Moreover, we are
concerned that under the proposed amendments proponents
would have the flexibility to choose to ignore the restraints
provided in Rule 14a-8. The amended provisions do not limit
the number of proposals a single proponent may submit, do
not impose a minimum share ownership requirement, do not
impose a resubmission threshold requirement, and do not
provide any limitations on the subject matter that may be
presented. Finally, companies would have the burden of
providing information to shareholders sufficient for them to
make informed voting decisions. This task might prove
impossible, depending on the coherence of the
communication by the proponent to the company.106
Ultimately, the Commission declined to adopt the amendment.
The Release ignored shareholder support and instead amended the
rule to codify the informal interpretation set out in Idaho Power.107
statement discussion on proposals which an issuer has been advised by counsel are
excludable.”). Or as some described, an “end run” around the rule. See Letter from
Am. Corp. Counsel Ass’n, to Jonathan G. Katz, Sec’y, SEC (Dec. 31, 1997),
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s72597/manning2.txt (“In general, we do not
believe Rule 14a-4 should be available to shareholders who wish to make an ‘end-run’
around the Rule 14a-8 shareholder proposal process. In this regard, some of the
changes proposed to Rule 14a-4(c) would make it both more burdensome for
companies to address non-Rule 14a-8 proposals, and would encourage shareholders
to bypass the Rule 14a-8 procedures, possibly resulting in more ‘personal’ proposals of
little interest to shareholders generally.”). See also Letter from Hewlett-Packard Co., to
Jonathan
G.
Katz,
Sec’y,
SEC
(Dec.
23,
1997),
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s72597/norlund1.htm (“We are very concerned
that the 14a-4 end-run used by many shareholder proponents has created a dual track
for shareholder proposals which vitiates the 14a-8 process. The ‘fix’ proposed in the
release does not go far enough to fix this problem. In fact, it seems to validate the
process by merely pushing back the required notice period.”).
105
Letter from Jeffrey R. Moreland, Senior Vice President, Burlington N. Santa Fe
Corp.,
to
Jonathan
G.
Katz,
Sec’y,
SEC
(Dec.
31,
1997),
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s72597/morelan1.txt (“BNSF believes that, on
balance, the proposed revisions to Rule 14a-4 would actually facilitate and encourage
14a-4 proposals. Indeed, the proposed revisions, if adopted, might encourage
proponents whose 14a-8 proposals have been excluded to resubmit them under 14a4.”).
106
Letter from Diane A. Ward, Senior Counsel, Atl. Richfield Co., to Jonathan G.
Katz,
Sec’y,
SEC
(Nov.
24,
1997),
https://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s72597/ward1.txt.
107
As one shareholder stated: “CalPERS does not believe that company
management needs this advantage, particularly when the proponent has not chosen
to impose upon the company the cost of distributing its proposal through submission

BROWN (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

10/27/2016 11:28 AM

THE PROXY RULES

67

Companies could obtain discretionary authority to vote against NonRule 14a-8 proposals so long as shareholders received adequate
disclosure.108 In doing so, the Commission reasoned that shareholders
benefited by avoiding “confusing” proxy cards.109
The final rule included only one exception. Discretionary
authority could not be used where companies were notified of a
counter-solicitation.110 Nonetheless, the rule made the exception
difficult to use. Shareholders had to agree to deliver a proxy statement
and proxy card to at least “the percentage of the company’s voting
shares required under applicable law to carry the proposal,”111 an
apparent attempt to overturn existing shareholder practices.112
Moreover, to alleviate an issuer “dilemma,”113 the rule required the
under Rule 14a-8. Most companies have the ability to amend their bylaws to require
advance notice of matters to be presented from the floor, should they believe this
notice is truly necessary. This is an area where Commission action is not necessary.”
Letter from Kayla Gillan, Gen. Counsel, Calpers, to Jonathan G. Katz, Sec’y, SEC (Nov.
10, 1997), https://corpgo.fatcow.com/calpers/CalPERS14a-8comments.html.
108
The Commission also retreated on the degree of disclosure required when
invoking discretionary authority. Rather than require a “discussion” of the non-14a-8
proposal, the standard set out in the proposing release, companies only had to “advise”
shareholders of the impending proposals. The final rule simply included a reminder
of the impact of the antifraud provisions. Amendments to Rules on Shareholder
Proposals, Exchange Act Release No. 40018, 1998 WL 254809, at *7 (May 21, 1998)
(“We remind you that the disclosure prescribed by amended rule 14a-4(c)(2), as with
any disclosure item, must take into account the disclosure requirements of the proxy
anti-fraud rule.”).
109
Id. (“Some stated that a voting box permitting shareholders to withhold
discretionary voting authority in some circumstances may be confusing if shareholders
are also independently solicited by the proponent in support of the same proposal.
We agree that inclusion of the proposed box on companies’ proxy cards may be
confusing in some circumstances.”).
110
Id. at *8 (“The final rule therefore precludes a company from exercising
discretionary voting authority on matters as to which it has received adequate advance
notice if the proponent provides the company as part of that notice with a statement
that it intends to solicit the percentage of shareholder votes required to carry the
proposal, followed with specified evidence that the stated percentage had actually
been solicited.”).
111
See SEC Solicitation of Proxies, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-4(c)(2)(i) (2012). The
adopting release suggests that the solicitation must be for a “significant percentage” of
the outstanding shares. As a practical matter, however, a precatory proposal will be
adopted when receiving a majority of the shares cast on the matter. As a result, there
is no fixed percentage of outstanding shares required to approve a precatory proposal.
112
Coffee, supra note 91, at 619–21 (“A preferred tactic appears to be to rely not
on Rule 14a-8, but instead to file an actual proxy solicitation covering the proposed
bylaw amendment and then only solicit a limited number of shareholders in order to
avoid unnecessary expense.”).
113
Amendments to Rules on Shareholders Proposals, Securities Exchange Act
Release No. 39093, 1997 WL 578696, at *21 (Sept. 18, 1997) (“For instance, if the
shareholder proponent files preliminary proxy materials after the company has filed
its own proxy statement, or even after the company has mailed its definitive proxy
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submission of the written notification114
commencement of the solicitation process.115

well

before

the

IV. PREVENTING THE EXERCISE OF DISCRETIONARY AUTHORITY
The amendments adopted in 1998 effectively ended any pretense
that the proxy rules duplicated rather than restricted the rights of
shareholders exercisable at the meeting. Discretionary authority could
be used to vote against proposals made at the meeting that were
unknown to management. Discretionary authority could be used to
vote against proposals made at the meeting but “omitted” under Rule
14a-8. Finally, discretionary authority could be used to vote against
proposals made at the meeting that were known to management so
long as shareholders were provided “advice on the nature of the
matter.”116
The proxy card was not required to offer a mechanism for
preventing the transfer of discretionary authority. Transfer could only
be blocked by withholding of the proxy card. The failure to return a
proxy card, however, came at a cost. Shareholders either had to
physically attend the meeting and cast a ballot or entirely forego their
voting rights.
Particularly in the case of institutional investors, the option of not
voting raised potential legal concerns. The decision could conflict
with their fiduciary obligations.117 At the same time, however, actual
attendance was, for the most part, an unacceptable alternative. For
statement and form of proxy to shareholders, the company may be placed in a
dilemma of either including the shareholder’s proposal on its proxy card, or risking
the delay and expense of a last-minute resolicitation. That is because the company
may not know whether the shareholder intends to begin to solicit proxies
independently by circulating his/her own proxy card, along with the definitive version
of his or her proxy statement, or how many shareholders will be solicited if such a
solicitation is actually launched.”).
114
Thus, knowledge that a counter-solicitation was likely would not be enough to
prevent the exercise of discretionary authority if not submitted in writing. See Thomas
W. Joo, The Modern Corporation and Campaign Finance: Incorporate Corporate Governance
Analysis into First Amendment Jurisprudence, 79 WASH. U. L. Q. 1, 55 n.328 (2001) (“Even
if management has reason to know that dissident shareholders may subsequently
launch an independent anti management proxy solicitation, management can retain
discretionary authority by disclosing its knowledge and intent to use its discretionary
authority to vote against dissident proposals if they are made.”).
115
See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-4(c)(2)(i) (2012) (requiring written notice at least fortyfive days before the date proxy materials were solicited the prior year or the date
specified in an advance notice bylaw).
116
Rule 14a-4(c)(2), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-4(c)(2) (2012).
117
See SEC Staff Legal Bulletin No. 20, 2014 WL 2965312, at *1 (June 30, 2014)
(“As a fiduciary, an investment adviser owes each of its clients a duty of care and loyalty
with respect to services undertaken on the client’s behalf, including proxy voting.”).
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one thing, the shareholder would need to travel to the meeting site, an
obvious expense.118 Attendance also presented opportunity costs. The
time could be spent doing something else more useful.
For investors with broad portfolios, actual attendance also raised
serious logistical impediments. Annual meetings for public companies
are bunched over a short period of time. In 2013, almost seventy
percent of the companies in the Fortune 500 and Russell 3000 held
their meetings in April, May, and June.119 As a result, pension plans
and mutual funds could find themselves needing to vote in hundreds,
if not thousands, of meetings in a compacted period of time.
Attendance at all or most of the meetings would be practically
impossible.
Nor were these the only difficulties. For the most part,
shareholders held their investments not as record owners120 but in
street name accounts.121 Shares were purchased through an account at
a broker and titled in the name of a depository. During the meeting
process, the depository executed an omnibus proxy and transfers
voting rights to the brokers.122 As a result, brokers, not street name
owners, received the proxy cards and returned them to the company,
thereby providing management with discretionary authority.123
Street name owners seeking to avoid the transfer of discretionary
118

To the extent the company held a virtual meeting, physical attendance would
be unnecessary. Shareholders would still, however, incur the opportunity costs
associated with attendance. See Coffee, supra note 91, at 620 (“Clearly, attendance at
the shareholder meeting in person in order to vote is too costly an alternative.”).
119
See J. ROBERT BROWN, JR. & LISA CASEY, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 455–56 (2d ed.
2016).
120
Direct registration provides a mechanism for ensuring that shareholders are
given record title to shares. See Transfer Agent Regulations, Exchange Act Release No.
76743, 2015 WL 9311555, at *14 (Dec. 22, 2015) (“In 1996, the Direct Registration
System (“DRS”) was implemented, which allowed investors to hold uncertificated
securities in registered form directly on the books of the issuer’s transfer agent.”). The
DRS allows investors to “retain the rights of registered owners, without having the
responsibility of holding and safeguarding securities certificates.” Concept Release on
the U.S. Proxy System, Exchange Act Release No. 62495, 2010 WL 2779423 (July 14,
2010). As a result, shareholders holding shares in this manner would receive a proxy
card directly from the company and need not obtain a proxy from the broker.
121
Transfer Agent Regulations, Exchange Act Release No. 76743, 2015 WL
9311555, at *16 (“The vast majority of security holders in the U.S. are beneficial owners
rather than registered owners.”).
122
For a discussion of this system of ownership, see J. Robert Brown, Jr., The
Shareholder Communication Rules and the Securities and Exchange Commission: An Exercise in
Regulatory Utility or Futility?, 13 J. CORP. L. 683 (1988) [hereinafter Brown, The Shareholder
Communication Rules].
123
Before returning the proxy card to the company, brokers solicit voting
instructions from street name owners. See Brown, The Shareholder Communication Rules,
supra note 122, at 704.
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authority must first reclaim from the broker the voting power for their
Broadridge, the agent typically used by brokers in
shares.124
connection with the proxy distribution process, allows street name
owners to obtain a “legal” proxy.125 The process results in the broker
appointing the street name owner as the agent to vote the shares.126
The broker also must notify the company “of the number of proxies
sent to customers and the identifying numbers and shares represented
by such proxies.”127
Once in possession of the “legal” proxy, street name owners can
prevent the transfer of discretionary voting authority. They may
decline to return the card, causing the shares not to be present at the
meeting for voting purposes. Alternatively, they may attend the
meeting and vote by ballot.128 The process of obtaining a “legal” proxy
and voting at the meeting has been described as “cumbersome and
expensive.”129
124

Exchange Act Release No. 29340, 2010 WL 2779423, at *8 n.50 (“Beneficial
owners may, however, request a proxy and attend the shareholder meeting. It is our
understanding that both banks and broker-dealers will issue a proxy that the beneficial
owner may use to attend a meeting if requested to do so.”).
125
For a version of the “legal proxy,” see Sample Legal Proxy,
MATERIALS.PROXYVOTE.COM,
https://materials.proxyvote.com/Approved/EPLST1/20100210/OTHER_52009/PD
F/broadridge-cis2010_0059.pdf. The legal proxy includes the CUSIP number for the
relevant class of shares, the number of shares, and the identity of the street name
owner.
See
NYSE
Rule
451.30,
http://nyserules.nyse.com/nysetools/PlatformViewer.asp?SelectedNode=chp_1_2&
manual=/nyse/rules/nyse-rules/ (setting out procedures for sending signed proxies
to customers, including “a code number for identification and the exact number of
shares held of record for the account of the customer” and “appropriate
instructions”).
126
Broadridge will subtract any shares subject to a “legal” proxy from the total
number of shares held by the broker. See Email from Chuck Callan, Senior Vice
President Regulatory Affairs, Broadridge, Fin. Sols., Inc., to author (Feb. 3, 2016, 6:38
MT) (on file with the author).
127
NYSE
Rule
451.30(3),
http://nyserules.nyse.com/nysetools/PlatformViewer.asp?SelectedNode=chp_1_2&
manual=/nyse/rules/nyse-rules/. The information does not include the identity of
the beneficial owner. As a result, the broker is obligated to send a follow up
communication to encourage return of the proxy upon the request of the issuer. Id.
at 451.30(4).
128
Internet Availability of Proxy Materials, Exchange Act Release No. 52926, 2005
WL 3610280, at *10 n.57 (Dec. 8, 2005) (“A beneficial owner could execute a proxy
directly if the intermediary (the holder of record) has appointed the beneficial owner
as its proxy with respect to the beneficial owner’s shares.”).
129
Letter from Glenn Davis, Dir. of Research, Council of Institutional Inv’rs, to
Elizabeth
Murphy,
Sec’y,
SEC
(Jan.
8,
2014),
https://www.sec.gov/rules/petitions/2014/petn4-672.pdf. (“The only tested and
certain way for a shareholder to vote freely for his or her individually preferred
combination of director candidates is to attend the meeting in person—obtaining a
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V. THE LIMITATIONS IMPOSED ON SHAREHOLDERS: A CASE STUDY
For the most part, companies cannot obtain discretionary
authority to vote on matters set out in the proxy statement and proxy
card.130 Shareholders planning to raise matters at the meeting,
therefore, have an incentive to invoke Rule 14a-8 and seek to include
the proposal in the company’s proxy statement. This is not, however,
always possible. The Commission has interpreted the requirements of
the rule to summarily exclude certain substantive topics otherwise
important to investors.
A. Auditor Qualifications
A critical example of this categorical approach involves the
exclusion of proposals relating to the selection or qualification of the
independent auditor. The importance of auditors and auditor
independence to investors is widely recognized.131
As one
Commissioner at the SEC described: “When an investor puts money
into a far off corporate enterprise, the auditor is an independent
accounting professional who serves as the eyes and ears of the
investor.”132
Despite the importance of the relationship, the staff of the
Commission has categorically allowed for the exclusion of almost every
proposal addressing auditors. In a misreading of the “ordinary
‘legal proxy’ from the broker if the shareholder holds its shares in ‘street name’ and
is not the record holder—and vote on the manual ballots distributed. This is a
cumbersome and expensive process that only the most sophisticated and deeppocketed shareholders understand and may consider pursuing.”).
130
They do have the right to vote on matters left blank in the proxy card. See supra
Section III.A.
131
See, e.g., SEC v. Transamerica Corp., 163 F.2d 511, 516–17 (3d Cir. 1947)
(“[T]he auditing of the books of a corporation is a proper subject for stockholder
consideration and action. Surely the audit of a corporation’s books may not be
considered to be peculiarly within the discretion of the directors. A corporation is run
for the benefit of its stockholders and not for that of its managers.”).
132
Kara M. Stein, SEC, Accountants and Capital Markets in an Era of Digital
Disruption, Remarks at the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales
and BritishAmerican Business (Sept. 9, 2015) (transcript available at
https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/remarks-inst-chartered-acctnts.html).
See also
Daniel L. Goelzer, Bd. Member, Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., Sarbanes-Oxley
and the Post-Enron Era, Address at Columbia University Law Center, Center for
Japanese
Legal
Studies
(Aug.
2,
2005)
(transcript
available
at
https://pcaobus.org/News/Speech/Pages/08022005_GoelzerSOXAuditorOversight.
aspx) (“Unlike other gatekeepers, it has always been recognized, at least in theory if
not always in practice, that the auditor has important obligations to the investing
public that may require him or her to act contrary to the interests of the client. . . .
Fundamentally, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act seeks to refocus auditor[s] on their obligations
to public shareholders.”).
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business” exclusion,133 proposals have been omitted that relate to the
“method of selecting the auditor”134 or “more generally” proposals that
relate to the “management of the independent auditor’s
engagement . . . .”135
As a result, the Commission has permitted the exclusion of
proposals addressing auditor rotation, irrespective of the period of
time involved.136 The same is true for proposals requesting changes to

133

SEC Solicitation of Proxies, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i)(7) (2012). Indeed, when
adopting the exclusion in subsection (i)(5), or matters not significantly related to a
company’s business, the Commission described shareholder ratification as a
“traditional shareholder proposal[] . . . .” Solicitations of Proxies, Exchange Act
Release No. 9784, 1972 WL 125400, at *2 (Sept. 22, 1972) (“Also, the provision is not
intended to serve as a basis for the omission of traditional shareholder proposals
dealing with stockholder relationships with the management, such as cumulative
voting, annual meetings, and ratification of auditors, since all these matters can be
considered significantly related to the issuer’s business or within its control.”).
134
The phrase was first used in 2001. See SONICblue Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2001
WL 306189, at *9 (Mar. 23, 2001) (describing exclusion of proposal requesting “that
the board of directors have the auditor selected annually by shareholder vote” under
(i)(7) as relating to “the method of selecting independent auditors”).
135
The phrase first appeared in 2010. See Masco Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 2010
WL 4922393, at *1, *4 (Jan. 13, 2010) (excluding proposal requesting that board
“adopt a resolution requiring that Masco limit the term of engagement of its
independent auditors to a maximum of five years” as relating “to limiting the term of
engagement of Masco’s independent auditors,” and noting that “[p]roposals
concerning the selection of independent auditors or, more generally, management of
the independent auditor’s engagement, are generally excludable under rule 14a8(i)(7)”). The phrase now routinely appears in no action letters relating to auditors.
See, e.g., JPMorgan Chase & Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 2010 WL 147300 (Mar. 5,
2010); Deere & Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 2011 WL 4551548 (Nov. 18, 2011); U.S.
Bancorp, SEC No-Action Letter, 2011 WL 5998983 (Dec. 16, 2011); Stanley Black &
Decker, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2011 WL 5927450 (Dec. 15, 2011); The Walt
Disney Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 2011 WL 5187234 (Nov. 23, 2011).
136
See Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 1991 WL 176503, at *1 (Jan. 18,
1991) (providing that the company “shall hire a new and different accounting firm
starting the four year period” as relating to “the method and criteria used to determine
the independent auditor selected”); see also S. New England Telecomm. Co., SEC NoAction Letter, 1991 WL 178481 (Feb. 11, 1991); ConAgra Foods, Inc., SEC No-Action
Letter, 2002 WL 1334815 (June 14, 2002); Bank of Am. Corp., SEC No-Action Letter,
2003 WL 40624 (Jan. 2, 2003); The Allstate Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 2003 WL
360106 (Feb. 5, 2003); Am. Fin. Gr., Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2002 WL 1058529
(Apr. 4, 2002). See also Lynne L. Dallas, The Control and Conflict of Interest Voting Systems,
71 N.C. L. REV. 1, 4, 189 (1992) (“In addition, while shareholders routinely vote at
annual meetings on auditors, they cannot, under the ordinary business exclusion,
suggest other auditors or even recommend that auditors be rotated from time to
time.”).
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the auditor,137 the adoption of specified qualifications,138 or the
development of data on “auditor reputation.”139 Exclusion has also
been permitted of proposals seeking a “justification for the retention
of the same audit firm”140 or “information about the company’s policies
or practices of periodically considering audit firm rotation. . . .”141
Proposals seeking information on the “financial capacity” of the
auditor were likewise excluded.142 Efforts to obtain reconsideration of
137

Refac, SEC No-Action Letter, 2002 WL 834233, at *1 (Mar. 27, 2002)
(requesting that “the board take the necessary steps to change the public accounting
firm engaged for the annual independent audit and to amend and improve corporate
disclosure practices” as relating to the “changing the current auditor” and the
disclosure of ordinary business matters”).
138
Comty. Bancshares, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1999 WL 166982, at *1–2 (Mar.
15, 1999) (commenting on proposal seeking to amend “the bylaws to require that the
independent auditor be a regional or national certified public accounting firm and
that the audit committee consist of independent directors” excluded under (i)(7) as
relating to the “selection and qualification of auditors” with letter stating that “[w]e
note in particular that the Wittmeier proposal requires the independent auditor be a
regional or national certified accounting firm”).
139
Cleveland-Cliffs Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2003 WL 942982, at *1 (Mar. 4,
2003) (stating exclusion of proposal requesting that the “board of directors to conduct
an annual, shareholder poll of auditor reputation and release the results of the poll to
the news media” under (i)(7) as relating to “the company’s selection of independent
auditors”); USG Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 2003 WL 942651, at *1 (Mar. 5, 2003)
(stating exclusion of proposal requesting that the “board of directors to conduct an
annual, shareholder poll of auditor reputation and release the results of the poll to
the news media” under (i)(7) as relating to “the company’s selection of independent
auditors”).
140
Gen. Elec. Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 2003 WL 292179, at *1 (Jan. 28, 2003)
(stating exclusion of proposal requesting that “the Board of Directors require the audit
committee to include in its committee report and recommendation: (1) the number
of consecutive years of service by the independent auditor and (2) if in excess of five
consecutive years, a clear justification for the retention of the same audit firm for such
extended period” under (i)(7) as relating to the “disclosure of the method of selecting
independent auditors”); see also Loews Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 2003 WL 292196,
at *1 (Jan. 28, 2003).
141
Comp. Scis. Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 2012 WL 1119677, at *1 (May 3, 2012)
(containing a proposal requesting “that the board audit committee prepare and
disclose to shareholders an annual ‘Audit Firm Independence Report’” that included
“information about the company’s policies or practices of periodically considering
audit firm rotation, seeking competitive bids from other public accounting firms for
audit engagement, and assessing the risks that may be posed to the company by the
long-tenured relationship of the audit firm with the company,” with the staff noting
that proposals “concerning the selection of independent auditors or, more generally,
management of the independent auditor’s engagement”); see also McKesson Corp.,
SEC No-Action Letter, 2012 WL 1023667 (May 3, 2012); Xilinx, Inc., SEC No-Action
Letter, 2012 WL 812910 (May 3, 2012); CA, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2012 WL
1574702 (May 3, 2012); Dell, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2012 WL 748852 (May 3,
2012); NetApp, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2012 WL 1549852 (May 10, 2012).
142
Occidental Petroleum Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1998 WL 17930, at *1 (Jan.
13, 1998) (allowing for the exclusion of a proposal requesting “that the board provide
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this approach by the staff has not proved successful.143
The proposals have been excluded despite the public policy
implications of the topic.144 At least since the demise of Enron, the role
of auditors as gatekeepers for shareholders has been a much debated
topic. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (“SOX”), legislation designed to
address the concerns arising out of the Enron crisis, created the Public
Company Accounting Oversight Board (“PCAOB”) to oversee
auditors.145 With respect to auditor rotation, SOX mandated a study of
the practice146 and the PCAOB conducted an extensive examination of
the matter.147 The European Union also imposed mandatory rotation
requirements on some public companies.148
certain information about the financial capacity of the Company’s auditors” under
(c)(7) as relating to “the selection of independent auditors”); LTV Corp., SEC NoAction Letter, 1998 WL 817825 (Nov. 25, 1998). See also LTV Corp., SEC No-Action
Letter, 1996 WL 741751, at *1 (Dec. 30, 1996) (allowing for the exclusion of a proposal
seeking a “report on the financial capacity of its independent auditors to pay claims
for malpractice, negligence or fraud” as relating to “the company’s selection);
Occidental Petroleum Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1997 WL 33767 (Jan. 22, 1997).
143
Likewise, reconsideration of the exclusion of proposals calling for increased
disclosure failed.
In Computer Sciences Corporation, shareholders sought
reconsideration of a proposal that sought to require disclosure of an Audit Firm
Independence Report, a report that among other things called for disclosure of board
policies with respect to audit rotation. Comput. Scis., Corp., SEC No-Action Letter,
2012 WL 2410961 (June 26, 2012). Shareholders argued that the information was
important to investors when approving auditors and electing directors. Id. at *4
(“There are two shareholder voting contexts in which the information requested in
the Proposal’s Independence Report is critically important: the election of directors
and the ratification of the selection of the external audit firm.”). Reconsideration,
however, was denied. Id. at *1 (“On May 3, 2012, we issued our response expressing
our informal view that Computer Sciences could exclude the proposal from its proxy
materials for its upcoming annual meeting. You have asked us to reconsider our
position. After reviewing the information contained in your letter, we find no basis to
reconsider our position.”).
144
The proposals were typically excluded under the “ordinary business” exclusion
contained in Rule 14a-8(i)(7). The exclusion, however, does not apply to matters of
important public policy. See Adrien Anderson, The Policy of Determining Significant Policy
under Rule 14A-8(i)(7), 93 DENV. L. REV. ONLINE 183 (2016).
145
See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 101, 116 Stat. 745 (2002),
http://pcaobus.org/About/History/Documents/PDFs/Sarbanes_Oxley_Act_of_200
2.pdf.
146
See id. § 207.
147
See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-04-216, PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRMS:
REQUIRED STUDY ON THE POTENTIAL EFFECTS OF MANDATORY AUDIT FIRM ROTATION
(2003).
148
See European Commission Press Release IP/14/104, European Parliament
backs Commission proposals on new rules to improve the quality of statutory audit
(Apr. 3, 2014), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_STATEMENT-14-104_en.htm
(“Public-interest entities will be required to change their statutory auditors after a
maximum engagement period of 10 years. Member States can choose to extend the
10-year period up to 10 additional years if tenders are carried out, and by up to 14
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B. Auditor Ratification
The approach taken with respect to auditor proposals was not
always so categorical. This was the case, for example, with respect to
proposals seeking the authority to ratify the auditor. As a matter of
governance, most companies, while not legally required, commonly
provide shareholders with the right to vote on the outside accounting
firm.149 In connection with the minority of public companies that did
not, shareholders sometimes submitted proposals under Rule 14a-8
requesting the authority.150
Efforts to exclude these proposals were initially unsuccessful.151 By
the new millennium, however, the position changed.152
The
additional years in case of joint audit, i.e. if the audited company appoints more than
one audit firm to carry out its audit. Calibrated transitional periods taking into
account the duration of the audit engagement are also foreseen to avoid a cliff effect
once the new rules apply.”).
149
See J. Robert Brown, Jr., The Politicization of Corporate Governance: Bureaucratic
Discretion, the SEC and Shareholder Ratification of Auditors, 2 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 501, 518
(2012) [hereinafter Brown, Politicization of Corporate Governance] (“Since the 1930s,
shareholders have routinely been given the right to ratify a company’s auditors.”).
150
Possible Revisions to Audit Committee Disclosures, Exchange Act Release No.
75344, 2015 WL 3982031, at *8 (July 1, 2015) (“While the audit committees of listed
issuers are required to appoint the issuer’s auditors, many issuers solicit the approval
or ratification of the independent auditors from shareholders.”) (citing Audit
Committee Reporting to Shareholders: Going Beyond the Minimum, ERNST & YOUNG (Feb.
2013),
http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/Audit_committee_reporting_to_share
holders%3A_going_beyond_the_minimum/$FILE/Audit_committee_reporting_CF0
039.pdf (noting that more than 90 percent of Fortune 100 companies seek annual
shareholder ratification of the auditor chosen by the audit committee).
151
Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1987 WL 107815, at *1 (Mar.
23, 1987) (not allowing for the exclusion of proposal seeking to have “the shareholders
elect the Company’s independent auditors annually” under subsection (c)(7)). The
position was not surprising. The Commission had previously acknowledged the
“significance” of the issue to shareholders. See Proposed Amendments to Rule 14(a)8 under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Relating to Proposals by Security Holders
(S7-643), Exchange Act Release No. 12598, 1976 WL 160410, at *7 (July 7, 1976)
(“[P]roposals dealing with cumulative voting rights or the ratification of auditors may
not be economically significant to an issuer’s business, but they nevertheless have a
significance to security holders that would preclude their being omitted under this
provision.”). Moreover, commentators noted in a matter of fact way the right of
shareholders under state law to vote on the auditor. See Milton V. Freeman, An Estimate
of the Practical Consequences of the Stockholder’s Proposal Rule, 34 U. DET. L.J. 549 (1957)
(“A shareholder always could stand up at a stockholders meeting and make a motion
that in the future the meeting should be held in some other city, that the auditors
should be elected by stockholders rather than selected by the directors alone, etc.”).
152
See SONICblue, supra note 134; see also Fleetwood Enters., Inc., SEC No-Action
Letter, 2002 WL 32078264, at *1 (Apr. 24, 2002) (discussing exclusion of proposal
requesting “that Fleetwood select its independent auditor annually by shareowner
vote” under (i)(7) as relating to “the method of selecting independent auditors”).
One earlier letter did permit the exclusion of a proposal calling for shareholder
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Commission did so without reference to the contrary precedent and
without an explanation for the shift in position.153 The change also
discounted the public policy implications of the issue154 and the

approval of the auditor. See Excalibur Techs. Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1998 WL
234151, at *1–2 (May 4, 1998). The facts, however, were somewhat unique. In
Excalibur Techs. Corp., the shareholder submitted a proposal requesting that the
“appointment of the Company’s independent auditors be subject to approval by the
shareholders at the annual meeting.” The company argued that an appointment by
shareholders would lock the company into a choice that might not be in the best
interests of shareholders. Id. Subsequent proposals would focus on ratification rather
than appointment. See infra note 153.
153
Paccar, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2004 WL 111635, at *1 (Jan. 14, 2004)
(proposal requesting “that the board of directors adopt a policy that the company’s
independent auditor be submitted to shareholder ratification” under (i)(7) as relating
to “the method of selecting independent auditors”); HRPT Props. Tr., SEC No-Action
Letter, 2004 WL 224449 (Jan. 28, 2004); USG Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 2004 WL
224463 (Jan. 28, 2004); Cousins Props. Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2004 WL 334466
(Feb. 17, 2004); Xcel Energy Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2004 WL 224479 (Jan. 28,
2004); Apache Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 2004 WL 224450 (Jan. 25, 2004); Wendy’s
Int’l, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2004 WL 224543 (Jan. 25, 2004).
154
Auditor ratification has been a much debated topic. With respect to auditor
ratification, a report from an advisory committee at the Department of the Treasury
recommended that shareholders in all companies have the authority. See U.S. DEP’T
OF TREASURY, FINAL REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON THE AUDITING PROFESSION
20 (2008). Calstrs petitioned the SEC to amend Rule 10A-3 to require shareholder
ratification of auditors. See Letter from Christopher Ailman, Chief Inv. Officer, Cal.
State Teachers’ Ret. Sys. Invs., to Florence E. Harmon, Acting Sec’y, SEC (Sept. 23,
2008), https://www.sec.gov/rules/petitions/2008/petn4-570.pdf.
Given the
importance of the ratification issue, calls have arisen to bar brokers from voting
uninstructed shares in connection with auditor approval. Letter from Brandon J. Rees,
Deputy Dir., AFL-CIO, to Brent J. Fields Sec’y, SEC (Sept. 8, 2015),
https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-13-15/s71315-73.pdf (“To make these votes a
more meaningful reflection of shareholder views, the SEC should also prohibit
discretionary voting on auditor ratification by brokers for their clients’ uninstructed
shares as is currently permitted by NYSE Rule 452.”). Perhaps most noticeably, the
need for improved disclosure in connection with shareholder ratification of the
auditor has been widely recognized, including by the Commission. In a concept
release, issued in 2015, the Commission noted the shortcomings of the current
disclosure regime and acknowledged “investors and other stakeholders have requested
greater transparency about audit committee activities.” Possible Revisions to Audi
Committee Disclosures, Exchange Act Release No. 75344, 2015 WL 3982031, at *8
(July 1, 2015) (“The rules do not require issuers to provide information about the
audit committee’s process and reasons that lead to the selection of the independent
auditor subject to the ratification solicitation.”) The release recognized the “public
interest” in the “subject of auditor tenure” and sought “feedback” to better understand
the types of disclosure that would be useful to investors. Id. at *9 (“Providing
additional disclosure about the audit committee’s oversight of the independent
auditor could further inform investors about the oversight process and provide them
with useful context for audit committee decisions. It may also enable investors to
differentiate between companies based on the quality of audit committee oversight,
and determine whether such differences in quality of oversight may contribute to
differences in performance or quality of financial reporting among companies.”).
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importance of the matter to shareholders.155 It took only a few years
before the exclusion of ratification proposals became routine.156
Efforts to convince the Commission to intervene and reverse the
position were unsuccessful.157
VI. ANALYSIS
Auditor related proposals demonstrate the limitations imposed
on shareholder voting rights under the proxy rules. Because of their
subject matter, the proposals are subject to a categorical exclusion
155

Only one meaningful exception to the categorical exclusion of auditor
proposals has apparently been made, arising from the deemed importance of the
subject to the public. In Safeway, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2002 WL 398743, at *1
(February 26, 2002), shareholders requested that the board adopt a policy “that in the
future the firm that is appointed to be the Company’s independent accountants will
only provide audit services to the Company and not provide any other services.” The
no action relief was not granted given “the widespread public debate concerning the
impact of non-audit services on auditor independence and the increasing recognition
that this issue raises significant policy considerations.” Id. See also V.F. Corp., SEC NoAction Letter, 2002 WL 500196, at *1 (March 7, 2002) (refusing to allow exclusion of
proposal requesting that the board adopt a policy “that the public accounting firm
retained by our Company to provide audit services, or any affiliated company, should
not also be retained to provide non-audit-services to our Company” and noting “the
widespread public debate concerning the impact of non-audit services on auditor
independence and the increasing recognition that this issue raises significant policy
considerations”).
156
Toys “R” Us, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2005 WL 448213, at *1 (Feb. 22, 2005)
(excluding proposal that requests the “board of directors adopt a policy that the
company’s independent auditor be submitted to shareholder ratification” under
(i)(7) as relating to “the method of selecting independent auditors”); Qwest
Commc’ns Int’l Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2005 WL 484382 (Feb. 23, 2005); Xcel
Energy Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2005 WL 484394 (Feb. 23, 2005). See also Brown,
Politicization of Corporate Governance, supra note 149, at 525 (“Despite the longstanding
and consistent position of the SEC, the staff unexpectedly concluded, without analysis
or explanation, that the proposal could be omitted under the ordinary business’
exclusion. The public importance of the debate over auditor independence received
no mention. In quick order, the position was repeated in other No-Action letters. By
2005, companies routinely received relief authorizing the exclusion of these sorts of
proposals.”).
157
The New York City Pension Funds submitted a number of proposals seeking
shareholder ratification of the auditor. In Rite Aid, the Commission concluded that
the matter related to the “method of selecting independent auditors.” Rite Aid Corp.,
SEC No-Action Letter, 2006 WL 871029, at *1 (Mar. 31, 2006). The Funds appealed
the decision, noting that the earlier letters had allowed for the exclusion of auditor
ratification proposals “without the benefit of any proponent opposition.” Id. Among
other things, the shareholder emphasized a speech made by the chair of the SEC that
emphasized “the need for auditor independence.” Id. Reconsideration, however, was
denied and the matter not presented to the Commission. See Brown, Politicization of
Corporate Governance, supra note 149, at 526 (“Again without explanation, the staff
denied the appeal and reaffirmed that auditor selection fell within the ‘ordinary
business’ exclusion. The action suggested acquiescence by the Commission in the
staff’s revised interpretation.”).
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from the proxy statement. The only alternative for shareholders
wanting to debate auditor related issues is to avoid Rule 14a-8 and raise
the matter directly at the meeting. Management, however, can use the
proxy process to obtain the discretionary authority necessary to ensure
the defeat of the proposal, preventing shareholders from providing
their collective views on the matter.
Rule 14a-4 reflects a microcosm in the development of the proxy
rules. The proxy rules began with the laudatory purpose of ensuring
that shareholders received the same rights as those exercisable at the
meeting.158 The evolution of the proxy rules has reflected the interests
of issuers159 because shareholders are poorly organized and, at least
initially, show limited interest in governance reform.160 The practice,
therefore, was to develop rules that restricted rather than duplicated
the rights of shareholders.
This approach can be seen with respect to the development of
Rule 14a-4. What ought to have been a highly technical but neutral
rule designed to ensure the proper exercise of voting authority has
evolved into a vehicle for limiting voting rights. A proxy card does not
provide the same choices as a ballot distributed at the meeting.161 The
obligation of impartiality additionally remains unenforced,162 with
158

See Hearings on H.R. 1493, supra note 3.
The involvement of shareholders in the evolution of the proxy rules increased
in the new millennium. See Brown, The Evolving Role of Rule 14a-8, supra note 10, at
162–63.
160
See Freeman, supra note 151, at 552–53 (noting that “the large shareholder is
not the source of stockholder proposals” but that the rule is used by “a very small
group” of “small stockholders, either individuals or organizations, with an investment
to which they are logically or emotionally committed for a long term”).
161
Ballots typically include all matters to be voted upon, including all candidates
seeking a position on the board. The rules do not, however, permit proxy cards to
include all choices. The absence of a universal proxy was the subject of a
recommendation by the SEC’s Investor Advisory Committee. See U.S. SECS. & EXCH.
COMM’N, RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE INVESTOR ADVISORY COMMITTEE REGARDING SEC
RULEMAKING
TO
EXPLORE
UNIVERSAL
PROXY
BALLOTS
(2013),
https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/investor-advisory-committee-2012/universal-proxyrecommendation-072613.pdf. It has been added to the reform agenda of the
Commission. See Mary Jo White, Chair of SEC, Remarks before the Society of
Corporate Secretaries and Governance Professionals: Building Meaningful
Communication and Engagement with Shareholders (June 25, 2015),
https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/building-meaningful-communication-andengagement-with-shareholde.html.
162
The Commission does not, for example, ensure that companies clearly title
shareholder proposals on the proxy card. See Lincoln Puffer, Note, Proxy Cards and the
Requirements of Clarity and Impartiality in Titling Proposals, 91 DENV. L. REV. ONLINE 167
(2014),
http://static1.1.sqspcdn.com/static/f/276323/24757109/1397944325807/Puffer_D
ULROnline_Final-Format.pdf?token=apTz888HEPm2o%2BDXT6moDQf1Un4%3D.
159
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management permitted to highlight proposals that it favors.163
Most importantly, however, the rule allows for the involuntary
transfer of voting rights for proposals known to management well in
advance of the meeting.164 Shareholders are left with a Hobson’s
choice of either conceding the transfer or preventing discretionary
authority by giving up the right to vote.165 Because discretionary
authority is permitted but not mandated, shareholders could try to
induce change through private ordering,166 convincing companies to
forego the authority,167 or to provide a mechanism on the proxy card
for the withholding of discretionary authority.168 At least one company
163

Adoption of Amendments to Proxy Rules, Exchange Act Release No. 4185, 1948
WL 28695, at *1 (Nov. 5, 1948) (“The draft of Rule X-14A-4 which was circulated for
public comment contained a provision that the form of proxy should contain no
recommendation with respect to any matter to be acted upon. Upon further
consideration of the matter, after reviewing the comments received, the Commission
believes that this proposed change in the text of the existing rule would introduce
ambiguities that would create administrative difficulties in construction and
application of the rule. For that reason, this provision has been omitted from the
amended rule.”).
164
See supra note 28.
165
See Coffee, supra note 91, at 620 (“[T]he public shareholder faces Hobson’s
Choice: the shareholder can either grant a proxy to management (knowing that
management will vote against this proposal) or refrain from voting.”). As discussed,
shareholder could block and vote by attending the meeting. Nonetheless, for the most
part, this is an impractical solution. See supra Section III.B.4.
166
See SEC Staff Financial Bulletin No. 89, 49 Fed. Reg. 4936 (May 31, 1961),
http://3197d6d14b5f19f2f4405e13d29c4c016cf96cbbfd197c579b45.r81.cf1.rackcdn.com/collection/papers/1960/
1960_1964_Interprt_Corp_Finance.pdf (no action letter providing that there would
be “no objection to a provision that a proxy would not be voted unless marked
notwithstanding that Rule 14a- 4(e) on its face requires that proxies be voted and
disclosure made of how they would be voted”).
167
See Rubbermaid Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1994 WL 4493, at *3 (Jan. 6, 1994)
(“The proposal requests that unvoted proxies not be counted. The Division is unable
to concur in your view that the proposal and supporting statement are false and
misleading within the meaning of rule 14a–9. According, we are unable to concur in
your view that the proposal may be omitted from the Company’s proxy materials in
reliance on rule 14a–8(c)(3). The Division is also unable to concur in your view that
the proposal is inconsistent with discretionary voting under rule 14a–4(c) or state law
and therefore excludable under rule 14a–8(c)(1), (c)(2) or (c)(3). In the staff’s view,
the cited provisions of federal and state law permit, rather than mandate, the
discretionary voting of proxies by management.”).
168
Some effort at private ordering has been made. See Rosemary Lally, Carpenters’
Fund Continues to Make Progress on Auditor Disclosure, COUNCIL OF INSTITUTIONAL INV’RS
(July
16,
2015),
http://www.cii.org/article_content.asp?edition=4&section=13&article=603
(discussion efforts by the United Brotherhood of Carpenters Pension Fund to send
letters to specified Fortune 500 firms in an effort to obtain information on auditor
practices, including the tenure of the firm and whether the committee periodically
considers whether there should be regular rotation of the auditor).

BROWN (DO NOT DELETE)

80

10/27/2016 11:28 AM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47:45

has implemented this approach.169 As Chevron’s proxy card provides:
The proxy holders will vote in accordance with their discretion
on such other matters as may properly come before the
meeting and any adjournment or postponement thereof,
including, without limitation, any proposal to adjourn the
meeting to a later time and place for the purpose of soliciting
additional proxies, unless the undersigned strikes out this
sentence.170
Private ordering could come about through the submission of
shareholder proposals on the subject.171 Shareholders could also seek
to engage in other types of self-help practices that are reminiscent of
the “just say no” campaigns.172 Shareholders could, for example,
collectively decide to not return their proxy cards to companies
seeking discretionary authority deemed excessively broad. In doing so,
the shares would not be present at the meeting and could not be used
for discretionary voting. Their absence would also potentially impair
efforts to obtain a quorum or the required percentage of votes needed
for approval.
The approach, however, is not likely to be effective. The efforts
would confront the logistical difficulties associated with obtaining a
proxy card.173 Shareholders opting not to return the card would, unless
attending the meeting or circulating their own proxy statement, be
169

See also In re Union Electric Co., 23 P.U.R.3d 351, 1958 WL 96119, at *4 (Mar.
21, 1958) (“Rule X–14A–4 specifically permits the form of proxy to grant discretionary
authority with respect to stockholder proposals omitted from a proxy statement
pursuant to Rule X–14A–8, and the situation here comes within the scope of that Rule.
It appears, as indicated above, that the stockholder may deny the authority in question
by deletion or insertion in the form of proxy.”).
170
See Chevron Corp., Definitive Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A) (May 27, 2015)
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/93410/000119312515123775/d858886d
def14a.htm (language appearing on the back of the proxy card in bold). For street
name owners, this authority would also need to appear on the voting instruction form.
See supra note 43.
171
Efforts to exclude proposals calling for an end to discretionary voting have not
been successful. See Centerior Energy Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1995 WL 18741,
at *1 (Jan. 18, 1995) (exclusion not permitted of proposal providing “that future
proxies shall have no discretionary voting power on matters where no voting directions
have been given”). Of course, most proposals are precatory. As a result, they advise
rather than require. See Brown, The Evolving Role of Rule 14a-8, supra note 10, at 151
(“Invariably phrased as a recommendation, the proposals advise rather than
command.”). To the extent receiving majority support, therefore, the proposals do
not automatically change behavior but require agreement of management.
172
The approach was first suggested by Professor Grundfest. See Joseph A.
Grundfest, Just Vote No: A Minimalist Strategy for Dealing with Barbarians Inside the Gates,
45 STAN. L. REV. 857, 903–08 (1993).
173
See supra Section IV.
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forced to give up their voting rights. Large investors with fiduciary
obligations would be unlikely to take these steps. As a result, support
among the largest shareholders would remain low. In any event,
private ordering would be a slow and difficult method of implementing
reform.174
Changes to the rule are, therefore, necessary.175 The proxy rules
require updating to reflect the current state of corporate governance,
particularly the more cooperative and interactive relationship between
owners and managers.176 The goal would be a return to first principals
and seek to ensure that the rules duplicated as much as possible the
rights provided shareholders at the meeting. This would require two
sets of changes to Rule 14a-4.
First, the rule should eliminate the right of companies to vote
partially completed proxies. The Commission recognized, in the
aborted reform efforts of 1979, that the evidence did not support the
conclusion that a partially executed card reflects an intent by investors
to allow management to vote the unmarked portions.177 As currently
configured, therefore, management has the ability to vote shares in a
manner inconsistent with shareholder intent.
Second, the rule should be amended to address the problem of
discretionary voting. One possibility would be to eliminate the practice
entirely. In some circumstances, however, the ability of management
to obtain voting discretion is arguably in the interests of investors. For
matters genuinely unknown a reasonable time before the meeting,
shareholders can benefit by having the matter resolved by persons
obligated to act in their best interests.178
174

In proposing a rule to provide shareholder access to the company’s proxy
statement for their nominees, the Commission specifically rejected arguments that the
matter should be left to private ordering, at least where the reform sought to facilitate
the exercise of shareholder rights guaranteed under state law. See Facilitating
Shareholder Director Nominations, Exchange Act Release No. 62764, 2010 WL
3343532 (Aug. 25, 2010) (“[W]e have reason to believe that reliance on private
ordering under state law would be insufficient to meet our goal of facilitating the
exercise of shareholders’ traditional state law rights to nominate and elect directors.”).
175
The Commission has sometimes noted the need to amend the proxy rules to
eliminate unnecessary restrictions on shareholder suffrage.
See Facilitating
Shareholder Dir. Nominations, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 60089, 2009 WL
1953653, at *5 (June 10, 2009) (“[W]e believe that parts of the federal proxy process
may unintentionally frustrate voting rights arising under state law, and thereby fail to
provide fair corporate suffrage.”).
176
See Brown, The Evolving Role of Rule 14a-8, supra note 10, at 179–80.
177
See supra note 53.
178
The authority to vote rests with the person appointed as the proxy. The
presence of fiduciary obligations depends upon the identity of the proxy. To the
extent an officer or director, the proxy will have the requisite duties. See supra note
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Other than unexpected matters, however, the argument for
discretionary authority—at least discretionary authority transferred on
an involuntary basis—is much weaker. To the extent management has
adequate notice of a proposal to be made at the meeting, shareholders
should have a say in the outcome. This is true for any matter submitted
in a timely fashion, whether omitted under Rule 14a-8 or submitted as
a “Non-Rule 14a-8 Proposal.”179 In those circumstances, the proxy
statement should disclose the matters and the proxy card (and by
extension the voting instruction form) should provide a mechanism
for shareholders to vote for or against the proposal. Alternatively, the
card could provide a mechanism to withhold discretionary voting.180
VII. CONCLUSION
The evolution of the proxy rules during their first half-century of
existence did not always reflect the legitimate interests of shareholders.
The rules sometimes reduced the rights that existed under state law.181
In particular, this occurred in connection with voting rights. Under
Rule 14a-4, shareholders were subjected to an involuntary transfer of
voting rights to management to resolve any proposal that did not
appear in the proxy statement but arose from the floor of the
meeting.182 The only practical way to prevent the transfer was to forsake
voting rights at the meeting.183
The evolution of the proxy rules has, however, become more
balanced.184 Yet the vestiges of earlier eras remain in place. As the
41.
179

See supra Sections III.B.2, III.B.3.
Two mechanisms have been suggested. Chevron provided an opportunity to
simply cross out the language authorizing discretionary authority. See supra note 170.
The Commission, on the other hand, proposed that proxy cards include “a box to
withhold discretionary authority.” Amendments to Rules on Shareholder Proposals,
Exchange Act Release No. 39093, 1997 WL 578696, at *41 (Sept. 18, 1997).
181
JANA Master Fund, Ltd. v. CNET Networks, Inc., 954 A.2d 335, 342 (Del. Ch.
2008) (“Rule 14a-8 is a compromise that allows for the presentation of some
shareholder proposals without the cost of soliciting proxies, but what a shareholder
may do under Rule 14a-8 is far different than what a shareholder may do on his or her
own.”), aff’d, 947 A.2d 1120 (Del. 2008).
182
See supra Section III.
183
See supra Section IV.
184
See Brown, The Evolving Role of Rule 14a-8, supra note 10, at 152 (“Once the Rule
was rewritten into plain English in 1998, evolution became more balanced. Indeed, in
2010, the Commission amended Rule 14a-8 in order to narrow one of the
exclusions.”). In 2010, the Commission amended Rule 14a-8 to narrow the scope of
exemption (i)(8). See Nicole L. Jones, Note, Shareholder Proposals, Director Elections, and
Proxy Access: The History of the SEC’s Impediments to Shareholder Franchise, DENV. L. REV.
(May
6,
2016),
http://www.denverlawreview.org/dlrONLINE
onlinearticle/2016/5/6/shareholder-proposals-director-elections-and-proxy-access180
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Securities Exchange Act of 1934 approaches its 82nd anniversary, care
needs to be taken so that the relevant rules and regulations retain their
vitality and effectiveness, reflecting not just the corporate governance
structure in place during the Great Depression, but also those that
exist today. In the proxy area, this means returning to a simpler, more
neutral, approach that better reflects the interests of all of the
participants in the corporate governance debate.
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